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German
Fleet sunk
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The fishermen at the pier
heard something which seemed like the firing of a rifle, and immediately
afterwards one of the German destroyers toppled over and sank
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All the German battleships and battle-cruisers interned at Scapa Flow, with the exception of the battleship Baden and five light cruisers, were sunk and abandoned by their crews on Saturday afternoon. Other vessels of the German fleet, including three light cruisers, have been beached.
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Rear-Admiral von Reuter, who is in custody with most of the Germans from the ships, admits that the vessels were sunk by his order. He states that he believed that the Armistice had been terminated, and that he gave the order in pursuance of orders given early in the war that no German man-of-war was to be surrendered.
It is pointed out that the conditions of the internment of the enemy fleet were laid down by the Inter-Allied Council, and that the responsibility for this act of the German crews must rest equally on all the Allies.
AN EYE-WITNESS’S STORY
Since the surrender of the German Fleet Scapa has had a peaceful aspect, but at mid-day yesterday the base was the scene of an unprecedented and treacherous act by the German seamen - the sinking of practically all the German ships which were interned there. It is supposed that the Germans, following some prearranged plan, removed the seacocks from their vessels, which immediately filled with water, heeled over, and sank. The crews left the ships shortly before the vessels settled down.
The story of an eye-witness as told to me is as follows: The small Wick motor-boat Betty had been fishing about two miles south-south-west of the Pentland skerries, and about 12 miles from the Cantag light, the nearest point to Scapa. The crew, instead of making for Wick Harbour with their catch of fish, proceeded northwards to Scapa, where they arrived about midday on Saturday. On reaching the entrance to Scapa they observed that something unusual had happened, as there was great commotion among the vessels anchored at the base. The first thing they observed was that a number of the German vessels were flying what they took to be the white German ensign. One of the crew of the motor-boat on coming alongside a destroyer asked what was taking place, and was informed that the Germans were sinking some of their own vessels. The flags which had been observed were hauled down before the motor-boat left Scapa.
As the motor-boat was proceeding towards the Scapa Pier the crew saw a large black object lying close to the bow of a German destroyer. This on closer examination proved to be the bow of one of the German vessels. When the fishermen had been at the pier about five minutes they heard something which seemed like the firing of a rifle, and immediately afterwards one of the German destroyers toppled over and sank. Shortly afterwards further firing was heard, and the men saw two German vessels heel over and sink. The crews on board these vessels jumped overboard just as the vessels, were settling down. One of the fishermen who was standing on the pier observed one of the big German warships with two white funnels sink and also saw a British vessel take a large German warship in tow and run her ashore.
Small boats were launched from the British vessels and proceeded to pick up the men in the water, but in spite of this the fishermen are of the opinion that a great number must have been lost.
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Views of
Admiral von Sheer
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"The terms of peace
brought men of our fleet to the realization, unfortunately too late, that
they had been misled, hoodwinked, and deceived"
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“I rejoice over the sinking of the German Fleet in Scapa Flow.” This is the statement made by Admiral von Scheer, the former Commander-in-Chief of the German High Seas Fleet, in an interview at Weimar with Mr Cyril Brown, the correspondent of the New York World. The Admiral who, besides voicing the satisfaction at the treachery of his men in terms which are a mixture of jubilation and insolent defiance, took the opportunity, as did General Ludendorff in a recent interview, to curry favour with America by making invidious comparisons between her motives and those of the other Allies in regard to the fixing of the terms of peace, as well as her probable future attitude towards Germany. He also imitates his late colleague in attempting to sow suspicion among the Allies through discussion of their future policies.
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With regard to the sinking of the German Fleet, Admiral von Scheer said his satisfaction arose from two causes. The first (he declared) is that the Fleet has been prevented from falling permanently into the hands of the British. It would have been painful for our good ships, after sailing the seas for years, to come under enemy flags. This humiliating and painful sight is now spared us by the brave deeds at Scapa Flow.
“The second reason why I rejoice is that the stain of surrender has been wiped from the escutcheon of the German Fleet. The sinking of the ships has proved that the spirit of the Fleet is not dead. This last act is true to the best traditions of the German Navy. The deed was spontaneous, and, I am convinced, was not ordered or inspired from Berlin. Our seamen were unwilling to bear the final disgrace or suffer that the ships should be turned over to the British.”
WHY THE MEN STRUCK
“More than this, the spirit of Scapa Flow points a significant moral. Our seamen, once removed from evil propaganda influence and left to come to their senses, again became mindful of their military honour. The terms of peace brought men of our fleet to the realization, unfortunately too late, that they had been misled, hoodwinked, and deceived. Subtle revolutionary propaganda had persuaded them they could end the war quickly by going on strike. They were told, and believed, that if they struck the seamen of the enemy fleets would revolt also, and that the war would thus be brought to an end automatically. In this misguided belief they started a revolution. Too credulous, they made the mistake of not waiting to let the other fellows strike first.”
Admiral von Scheer then proceeded to disclose the plans for a naval attack on England, which had been frustrated by the mutiny of the sailors of the Fleet:
“It was never our intention (he said) to send the High Seas Fleet out to certain death. At the beginning of the November revolt we were on the eve of undertaking a naval operation from which we promised ourselves the utmost success. This operation, after nearly two years, had at last been made possible by the discontinuance of our submarine warfare during the negotiations leading up to the Armistice. For nearly two years we had been unable to undertake an operation on a large scale with the High Seas Fleet, first because the Fleet was essential to protect the base for our submarine warfare; and secondly, because, while our submarine warfare was carried on we lacked all strategic flank protection for a long-distance naval operation. Our fleet attack could proceed only from the narrow Wet Triangle behind Heligoland. To this base alone we were always forced to return. An operation of the High Seas Fleet against any point on the British coast left both our flanks exposed. The battle of Jutland proved that we were not afraid of encountering the British Grand Fleet on a fair field. In an operation against the British coast our strategic left flank was always exposed to attack by British naval forces coming from the Channel, and our right flank to attack from the north.
“With the suspension of submarine warfare this unfavourable strategic situation suddenly changed. We now had plenty of submarines to use for the flank protection of our High Seas Fleet. With our hands thus freed we decided at the beginning of November that our Fleet should strike a hard and perhaps decisive blow. We decided that while our Armies were stubbornly and heroically resisting, our Fleet should not remain idle. Our plan offered every chance of success. It was not one to send the High Seas Fleet out to death, but to attack the coast of England in the direction of the mouth of the Thames, employing submarines as flank protection. By this plan we hoped to draw the British Grand Fleet out of its Scottish lair down toward the mouth of the Thames to give us battle, in which case the Grand Fleet would have run into our flanking submarines. Our plan was carefully worked out and offered the certainty of success if the Grand Fleet came out. The one chance of failure we foresaw was that the British Fleet might not be coaxed out by our Channel attack.
The Admiral then entered on an elaborate explanation of the motives of the surrender of the German Fleet: “Our plans for attack (he went on) naturally could not be disclosed to the men of the Fleet, and from the preparations for the operation they got the fatal idea into their propaganda-turned heads that the Fleet was about to be sent out to its death. ‘Why’, they argued, ‘should we die on the verge of peace, with negotiations for an armistice going on?’ In this misguided frame of mind they mutinied and started the revolution which they have since come to regret bitterly. They thought they were doing right and that their action would secure a just and equitable peace for the Fatherland. They still thought so when they took the ships to Scapa Flow to be interned. I am convinced that not an officer or a man would have been willing to take the ships to Scapa Flow if he had known how peace would ultimately be imposed.”
LORD JELLICOE CRITICIZED
The late Commander-in-Chief joined issue with Lord Jellicoe, whose history, remarks the World correspondent, “heavily under-scored and annotated, is a fixture on the desk of his late adversary.” According to the correspondent Admiral von Scheer intends to attack Lord Jellicoe for the imputation that the German Fleet was afraid to come out and meet the British. The Admiral suggested that it was Lord Jellicoe’s business to attack him because he (Lord Jellicoe) had much the stronger forces at his disposal. “He made the remarkable statement to me (writes Mr Brown) that Great Britain could have ended the war quickly in its early stages by a bold offensive in the spirit of Nelson.”
“Right up to the last moment we did not expect England to enter the war,” said von Scheer. “Accordingly we were not prepared against a naval attack by Great Britain. We were prepared only for a two-front war. Accordingly, the third front, our sea front, was denuded of military forces. If the British Fleet had attacked in the first week of the war we should have been beaten. Under cover of the British Navy the Russian armies, then available in great numbers, could have been landed on the coast of Pomerania and could have easily marched to Berlin. I believe the British Fleet did not attack in the first weeks of the war because Great Britain did not want to pay the price of victory. She hoped to keep her Fleet intact for pressure on the Peace Conference, and thought it wiser to let the French and Russians win the war on land.
“In itself Admiral Jellicoe’s slow blockade strategy was correct and accomplished its purpose. No. fault can be found with it, provided his confining the Fleet to a blockade can be reconciled with the traditions of the British Navy. I suspect, also, that there were no plans prepared at the beginning of the war for joint operations by the British, French, and Russian Fleets. I believe also that the British Fleet was not used for attack early in the war because nobody at that time knew just what would be the effect of torpedoes and mines in actual practice, and Admiral Jellicoe thought it best to lay off. Where I find fault with Lord Jellicoe is that he implies that we, in far the less favourable strategic position, should have done what he hesitated to do with the advantage of position and superior forces.”
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The German
Fleet's honour
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Admiral von Scheer's
statement is mostly insolent lies
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To the Editor of The Times.
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Sir, Admiral von Scheer has said, according to The Times today, that the sinking of the Hun Fleet at Scapa Flow was a brave deed, that it proved that the spirit of the Fleet was not dead, and that the action was true to the best traditions of the German Navy.
Opening a valve and letting a ship sink, when there was no one to stop it, and with an assurance of personal safety to the perpetrator, is considered by Admiral von Scheer to be a brave action! With our knowledge of their mentality, this is exactly the opinion that we should have expected from a Hun AdmiraL “This last act is true to the best traditions of the German Navy.” It is!
The remainder of Admiral von Scheer’s statement is mostly insolent lies. His excuse for the Hun Fleet not undertaking an operation on a large scale - that it was wanted to protect the base for their submarine warfare - is untrue, because the Fleet was not protecting the base, it was bottled up doing nothing. His statement that the Battle of Jutland proved that they were not afraid of the British Fleet is untrue, because Jellicoe made them run away. His implication that he was ready to meet our Fleet at Jutland “on a fair field” is obviously false, because he himself says that they were not prepared “to send the High Seas Fleet out to certain death”, but that their plan of attack was to lure the British Fleet down on to their submarines.
Why does not von Scheer tell us why his submarines did not sink our Fleet in Scapa Flow? Was it in accordance with the best traditions of the Hun Navy to take no risks?
The world now knows its tradition to be cruelty, chicane, and Surrender.
Yours faithfully,
PERCY SCOTT, Admiral,
52 South Audley Street, SW1, July 1.
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