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Following over five months of bitter fighting on this virtually unheard of island in the Pacific, the US shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility, stopping the apparently irresistible Japanese advance in its tracks. Although the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea are described as turning points, it was at Guadalcanal that the Japanese offensive was ground to a halt. Following their defeat there were no other advances made by the Japanese in the Pacific. Victory came at a price, however: by the end of the campaign American and Japanese casualties topped 30,000.
The battle was unique for several reasons. Throughout the battle – the longest one fought in the Pacific campaign – both forces were fighting at the farthest end of their supply lines. Tropical illnesses, the harsh climate and the rough terrain were an enemy to both sides. Ship losses off Guadalcanal were so great that the waters along the north coast would become known as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’.
Further reading
Essential Histories 18: The Second World War (1) The Pacific provides an overview of this theatre, showing the battle of Guadalcanal in the context of Pacific campaign.
Campaign 18: Guadalcanal 1942 gives a detailed summary of the battle.
Men-at-Arms 369: The Japanese Army 1931¬–45 (2) 1942–45 describes the history, uniforms and organization of the Japanese Army in the Pacific.
Men-at-Arms 342: The US Army in World War II (1) The Pacific describes the organization, uniforms and equipment of the US Army in the CBI and the Central and South-West Pacific from 1941 to 1945.
Warrior 45: US Infantryman in World War II (I) Pacific Area of Operations 1941–45 details the experiences of the American soldiers who fought the Japanese across the Pacific islands, and the specific nature of this combat environment.
New Vanguard 33: M3 & M5 Stuart Light Tank 1940–1945 describes how the M3 and M5 light tanks proved more suitable in the Pacific theatre than in Europe, and fought successfully in many of the major battles including Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Peleliu.
The Guadalcanal Campaign
The following extract from Campaign 18: Guadalcanal 1942 describes the last few days of the campaign, in early February 1943, as the Japanese carried out their evacuation, and the Americans pushed northwards towards Cape Esperance:
The Final Phase
By the first week of February 1943, Admiral Halsey had been led to expect the Japanese to make another full scale offensive – all intelligence reports pointed to an all-out Japanese effort in the region. But American intelligence had been deceived by the Japanese. After repeated failed offensives, the Japanese had decided to withdraw. To deceive the Americans, and to give the impression they were preparing for a major offensive, they increased their activities in the area while in reality preparing to evacuate the remaining troops from Doma Cove in the Cape Esperance area. To cover this withdrawal, the Japanese placed 600 troops ashore near Cape Esperance on 14 January, and an additional force landed for a short time in the Russell Islands just to the northwest of Guadalcanal. The Japanese plan called for night withdrawal by destroyer transport, but in the event this was not possible. Barges were to be used to transport the troops to the Russells, where they would be picked up and then taken north.
XIV Corps reached the Poha River on 25 January. Now the campaign began to enter its final stage. A field order was issued directing the combined Army Marine Division (CAM) to attack west on 26 January at 0630; the 6th Marines would move along the northern or beach flank while the 182nd Infantry advanced along the southern, more hilly flank. The 147th Infantry would be in Division Reserve, while the Americal and 35th Division’s Artillery, along with 2nd Marine Air Wing, would provide direct support for the operation.
The CAM Division’s attack began on 26 January and advanced 1,000 yards beyond the Poha River. The Division continued its advance the next day to the Nueha River, where it consolidated its positions.
On 29th January 1943, General Patch detached the 147th Infantry from the CAM Division and reinforced them with artillery from 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines and 97th Field Artillery Battalion. This composite force was paced under Brigadier General Alphonse De Carre, the Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Marine Division, and was tasked with pursuing the Japanese.
On 30 January at 0700, the 147th Infantry advanced westwards. The supported advance was slowed down by determined Japanese resistance at the Bonegi River. The attack continued the next day, assisted by artillery support. The plan of the attack called for the 1st and 2nd Battalions to force a crossing along the coast while the 3rd Battalion would cross inland and capture the ridges to the south, but determined Japanese resistance stalled the coastal advance.
On 1 February 1943, Brigadier General Sebree, Commanding General of the Americal Divisions, took command of the operation. The attack continued, but so did Japanese resistance, which effectively stopped the Americans. Then on 2 February, the Japanese pulled back. It was estimated that 700-800 Japanese had been in the area. Between 3 and 5 February, the Americans advanced west to the Usmani River, meeting no organized resistance.
By early February, General Patch was convinced that the Japanese were no longer going to mount a new offensive. Hen considered that they were probably planning a withdrawal from Guadalcanal – which he wanted to prevent.
XIV Corps staff had completed plans to land a reinforced battalion on the south-west coast; their mission would be to advance to Cape Esperance and attack the Japanese from the rear, cutting off their escape route. The attack would be led by the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry Regiment under Colonel Alexander M. George. Further consideration led to the conclusion that the reinforced battalion might not be sufficiently strong enough to land should there be heavy Japanese opposition, so a small reconnaissance force would land first and set up an advanced post at Titi to determine the strength of the Japanese. This was accomplished in a shore to shore landing on 1 February. Once ashore, the force made effective a reconnaissance of the entire area and recommended that the battalion by landed at Verahue then move towards Titi.
On 2 February Colonel George’s battalion began its advance. Two days later it linked up with the reconnaissance force at Titi, then continued its advance. By 7 February it had reached Marovovo where it settled in for the night.
The movement to Marovovo had been somewhat constrained by a lack of accurate information about the Japanese in the area, and during the day Colonel George had been wounded in the leg. General Patch, who wanted the operation speeded up, sent Colonel Gavan to the battalion’s position; but once there he concluded that the operation was progressing satisfactorily and had Colonel George evacuated by boat.
Meanwhile, back at the north coast, General Patch relieved the under-strength 147th Infantry Regiment and ordered the 161st Infantry Regiment (Reinforced), to continue pursuit of the Japanese. Both forces continued their respective advances, meeting only minimal resistance. On 9 February, they met at Tenaro village, and the campaign was now officially over. But 13,000 Japanese had escaped Guadalcanal: the American pincer plan, although excellent in conception, had been executed too slowly.
Indeed, the Japanese had fought a calculated delaying action throughout the final phase, which had begun on 12 January when the Japanese high command issued orders for the withdrawal. Staff officers boarded a destroyer and landed on Guadalcanal. There they proceeded to Seventeenth Army Headquarters and informed General Hyakutake of his new instructions on 15th January. Explaining this new plan to his troops as a change in disposition due to an upcoming future operation, Hyakutake then ordered a withdrawal of Seventeenth Army to Cape Esperance on 22-23 January 1943. the rescuing destroyers made three runs and evacuated the troops during the nights of 1/2, 4/5, and 7/8 February; there were then evacuated to Buin and Rabaul.
The Japanese in the end had been skilful and cunning. Nevertheless the essential significance of the campaign was unchanged. The first phase of the Solomons campaign was concluded as a victory for the Americans, and the first major step ha been taken in the reduction of Rabaul.
The battle was unique for several reasons. Throughout the battle – the longest one fought in the Pacific campaign – both forces were fighting at the farthest end of their supply lines. Tropical illnesses, the harsh climate and the rough terrain were an enemy to both sides. Ship losses off Guadalcanal were so great that the waters along the north coast would become known as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’.
Further reading
Essential Histories 18: The Second World War (1) The Pacific provides an overview of this theatre, showing the battle of Guadalcanal in the context of Pacific campaign.
Campaign 18: Guadalcanal 1942 gives a detailed summary of the battle.
Men-at-Arms 369: The Japanese Army 1931¬–45 (2) 1942–45 describes the history, uniforms and organization of the Japanese Army in the Pacific.
Men-at-Arms 342: The US Army in World War II (1) The Pacific describes the organization, uniforms and equipment of the US Army in the CBI and the Central and South-West Pacific from 1941 to 1945.
Warrior 45: US Infantryman in World War II (I) Pacific Area of Operations 1941–45 details the experiences of the American soldiers who fought the Japanese across the Pacific islands, and the specific nature of this combat environment.
New Vanguard 33: M3 & M5 Stuart Light Tank 1940–1945 describes how the M3 and M5 light tanks proved more suitable in the Pacific theatre than in Europe, and fought successfully in many of the major battles including Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Peleliu.
The Guadalcanal Campaign
The following extract from Campaign 18: Guadalcanal 1942 describes the last few days of the campaign, in early February 1943, as the Japanese carried out their evacuation, and the Americans pushed northwards towards Cape Esperance:
The Final Phase
By the first week of February 1943, Admiral Halsey had been led to expect the Japanese to make another full scale offensive – all intelligence reports pointed to an all-out Japanese effort in the region. But American intelligence had been deceived by the Japanese. After repeated failed offensives, the Japanese had decided to withdraw. To deceive the Americans, and to give the impression they were preparing for a major offensive, they increased their activities in the area while in reality preparing to evacuate the remaining troops from Doma Cove in the Cape Esperance area. To cover this withdrawal, the Japanese placed 600 troops ashore near Cape Esperance on 14 January, and an additional force landed for a short time in the Russell Islands just to the northwest of Guadalcanal. The Japanese plan called for night withdrawal by destroyer transport, but in the event this was not possible. Barges were to be used to transport the troops to the Russells, where they would be picked up and then taken north.
XIV Corps reached the Poha River on 25 January. Now the campaign began to enter its final stage. A field order was issued directing the combined Army Marine Division (CAM) to attack west on 26 January at 0630; the 6th Marines would move along the northern or beach flank while the 182nd Infantry advanced along the southern, more hilly flank. The 147th Infantry would be in Division Reserve, while the Americal and 35th Division’s Artillery, along with 2nd Marine Air Wing, would provide direct support for the operation.
The CAM Division’s attack began on 26 January and advanced 1,000 yards beyond the Poha River. The Division continued its advance the next day to the Nueha River, where it consolidated its positions.
On 29th January 1943, General Patch detached the 147th Infantry from the CAM Division and reinforced them with artillery from 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines and 97th Field Artillery Battalion. This composite force was paced under Brigadier General Alphonse De Carre, the Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Marine Division, and was tasked with pursuing the Japanese.
On 30 January at 0700, the 147th Infantry advanced westwards. The supported advance was slowed down by determined Japanese resistance at the Bonegi River. The attack continued the next day, assisted by artillery support. The plan of the attack called for the 1st and 2nd Battalions to force a crossing along the coast while the 3rd Battalion would cross inland and capture the ridges to the south, but determined Japanese resistance stalled the coastal advance.
On 1 February 1943, Brigadier General Sebree, Commanding General of the Americal Divisions, took command of the operation. The attack continued, but so did Japanese resistance, which effectively stopped the Americans. Then on 2 February, the Japanese pulled back. It was estimated that 700-800 Japanese had been in the area. Between 3 and 5 February, the Americans advanced west to the Usmani River, meeting no organized resistance.
By early February, General Patch was convinced that the Japanese were no longer going to mount a new offensive. Hen considered that they were probably planning a withdrawal from Guadalcanal – which he wanted to prevent.
XIV Corps staff had completed plans to land a reinforced battalion on the south-west coast; their mission would be to advance to Cape Esperance and attack the Japanese from the rear, cutting off their escape route. The attack would be led by the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry Regiment under Colonel Alexander M. George. Further consideration led to the conclusion that the reinforced battalion might not be sufficiently strong enough to land should there be heavy Japanese opposition, so a small reconnaissance force would land first and set up an advanced post at Titi to determine the strength of the Japanese. This was accomplished in a shore to shore landing on 1 February. Once ashore, the force made effective a reconnaissance of the entire area and recommended that the battalion by landed at Verahue then move towards Titi.
On 2 February Colonel George’s battalion began its advance. Two days later it linked up with the reconnaissance force at Titi, then continued its advance. By 7 February it had reached Marovovo where it settled in for the night.
The movement to Marovovo had been somewhat constrained by a lack of accurate information about the Japanese in the area, and during the day Colonel George had been wounded in the leg. General Patch, who wanted the operation speeded up, sent Colonel Gavan to the battalion’s position; but once there he concluded that the operation was progressing satisfactorily and had Colonel George evacuated by boat.
Meanwhile, back at the north coast, General Patch relieved the under-strength 147th Infantry Regiment and ordered the 161st Infantry Regiment (Reinforced), to continue pursuit of the Japanese. Both forces continued their respective advances, meeting only minimal resistance. On 9 February, they met at Tenaro village, and the campaign was now officially over. But 13,000 Japanese had escaped Guadalcanal: the American pincer plan, although excellent in conception, had been executed too slowly.
Indeed, the Japanese had fought a calculated delaying action throughout the final phase, which had begun on 12 January when the Japanese high command issued orders for the withdrawal. Staff officers boarded a destroyer and landed on Guadalcanal. There they proceeded to Seventeenth Army Headquarters and informed General Hyakutake of his new instructions on 15th January. Explaining this new plan to his troops as a change in disposition due to an upcoming future operation, Hyakutake then ordered a withdrawal of Seventeenth Army to Cape Esperance on 22-23 January 1943. the rescuing destroyers made three runs and evacuated the troops during the nights of 1/2, 4/5, and 7/8 February; there were then evacuated to Buin and Rabaul.
The Japanese in the end had been skilful and cunning. Nevertheless the essential significance of the campaign was unchanged. The first phase of the Solomons campaign was concluded as a victory for the Americans, and the first major step ha been taken in the reduction of Rabaul.
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