AUSTRIAN BRIDGE ON THE OLD PIAVE
BRITISH TROOPS POSTED IN A WATERCOURSE ON THE ITALIAN FRONT
ITALIANS TAKING UP POSITIONS ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PIAVE
The German blow at Italy
Should Germany gain military successes on the Isonzo, as she is doing, she may be able to revive the moral of the Austrian Army and the spirits of the people of Vienna and Budapest
October 27, 1917
The dispatches we publish today contain grave warnings. The Germans have not hitherto taken part in the operations on the Italian front, but our Military Correspondent stated in an article published yesterday that they have now formed a 14th Army for this special purpose, and have placed in it “a number of good divisions of the Active Army”. The correspondents on the Isonzo say that the enemy seem to have transferred “the whole of their Russian front here,” and though the statement need not be taken very literally, it is clear that the inactivity of the Russian Army is the true cause of the Austro-German advance.
We are told quite frankly that the enemy aim at far more than the recovery of the ground won from Austria on the Isonzo. They intend to invade the Italian plains, if they can, and already they claim to be across the italian frontier “at many points”. They have struck with shrewd insight into the military situation. The Italians have never been able to accomplish on the Middle Isonzo advances corresponding to their brilliant successes farther south. They therefore did not hold their line above Tolmino with a strength such as they have maintained on the Carso and beyond Gorizia. The enemy evidently chose to attack on the Middle Isonzo because victory there might compel an Italian retirement in the Gorizia sector, and still more because it offered the shortest way to the plains.
The reasons which have led the Germans to launch this swift blow are presumably both military and political. The military possibilities are obvious. The political reasons are twofold, and relate both to Italy and to Austria. The Austrian Army on the Italian front has never been under direct German control, and Germany may have had reasons to think a continuance of its autonomy undesirable. The civil population in Austria is exceedingly dispirited, and the internal economic conditions are bad. Should Germany gain military successes on the Isonzo, as she is doing, she may be able to revive the moral of the Austrian Army and the spirits of the people of Vienna and Budapest.
With regard to Italy, the German object doubtless is to intensify and deepen the internal political difference which, by a coincidence, led to the defeat of the Italian Ministry on Thursday. In this respect German calculations are unquestionably at fault, as is so often the case. The opposition to Signor Boselli’s Government appears to be due to a widespread conviction that war problems have not been handled with sufficient firmness and promptitude. The predominant desire of the critics of Signor Boselli is to create a more vigorous War Government The menace of invasion will probably strengthen their aspirations, with results which Germany is not likely to appreciate. She thought to weaken Italy, but she will doubtless quickly find that her attack has had the reverse effect.
The immediate military possibilities of the Austro-German offensive are of a character which Allies must instantly take into account. From Saga to a point just north of Canale, the Italians have withdrawn behind their own frontier, and they may therefore be compelled to sacrifice their brilliant gains on the Great Bainsizza plateau. They are being pressed on the slopes of Monte San Gabriele, and their positions beyond Gorizia may eventually be affected.
The weight of the thrust against General Cadorna is evidently heavy, but he is stanch of heart and deft of hand. He met and countered in the Trentino last year a peril which, at first, seemed almost equally menacing. We must await further developments before definitely measuring the full significance of the new stroke, but it must be said without delay that an extensive invasion of Italy at this juncture would affect the whole Allied cause. In that spirit measures must be taken should the necessity arise. We are entering another phase of violent fluctuations in the war, not all of which are to the enemy’s advantage.
The reasons which have led the Germans to launch this swift blow are presumably both military and political. The military possibilities are obvious. The political reasons are twofold, and relate both to Italy and to Austria. The Austrian Army on the Italian front has never been under direct German control, and Germany may have had reasons to think a continuance of its autonomy undesirable. The civil population in Austria is exceedingly dispirited, and the internal economic conditions are bad. Should Germany gain military successes on the Isonzo, as she is doing, she may be able to revive the moral of the Austrian Army and the spirits of the people of Vienna and Budapest.
With regard to Italy, the German object doubtless is to intensify and deepen the internal political difference which, by a coincidence, led to the defeat of the Italian Ministry on Thursday. In this respect German calculations are unquestionably at fault, as is so often the case. The opposition to Signor Boselli’s Government appears to be due to a widespread conviction that war problems have not been handled with sufficient firmness and promptitude. The predominant desire of the critics of Signor Boselli is to create a more vigorous War Government The menace of invasion will probably strengthen their aspirations, with results which Germany is not likely to appreciate. She thought to weaken Italy, but she will doubtless quickly find that her attack has had the reverse effect.
The weight of the thrust against General Cadorna is evidently heavy, but he is stanch of heart and deft of hand. He met and countered in the Trentino last year a peril which, at first, seemed almost equally menacing. We must await further developments before definitely measuring the full significance of the new stroke, but it must be said without delay that an extensive invasion of Italy at this juncture would affect the whole Allied cause. In that spirit measures must be taken should the necessity arise. We are entering another phase of violent fluctuations in the war, not all of which are to the enemy’s advantage.
The invasion of Italy
It has often been said that the Allied Front is one single line. In the truest sense the Isonzo is our front as much as the Somme and the Lys. Now that it has collapsed, we must do our best without delay to repair it
October 29, 1917
The cause of the disaster is not yet fully explained. One of the correspondents at the front states that the left wing of the Second Army was assailed by a specially potent gas to which Italian troops, at any rate, were unaccustomed. The gas attack was followed by a terrific bombardment from numbers of new batteries whose existence was entirely unsuspected. The enemy had brought up and concealed these guns under cover of night. Finally, the infantry assault was delivered in drenching rain and was masked by a thick mist. Troops so suddenly and fiercely tried may well have given way, and the gallant Italian Army has proved its courage and devotion so often in this war that there is no stain upon its honour.
The immediate results unfortunately are already grievous enough. The enemy have burst through on almost the whole line of the Middle and Upper Isonzo. They have poured down the Natisone Valley, and, having entered on Saturday night the town of Cividale del Friuli (which was in flames), they must have been debouching on the Friulian plain yesterday morning. As a consequence Gorizia has been evacuated, though according to the last accounts Monte San Michele and the Valonne positions on the Carso are still being held by our Allies. In the face of a transformation so sweeping and complete it seems useless to examine in much detail the movements which have placed Italy in such grave danger.
The first sign of the impending onslaught was noticed on Monday, October 22, when the enemy’s artillery was unusually active on the Upper Isonzo. On Monday the Italians reported a strong Austro-German attack on Monte Piano, on the frontier of the Cadore, far to the north-west of the present great offensive. This announcement was highly significant. It was the first intimation of the presence of Germans on the Italian front, and we have still to see whether it portends a thrust from the Pustherthal as well as from the Isonzo. Monte Piano commands the Col St Angelo, over which runs the road leading to Auronzo and the Piave Valley, and though the lateness of the season ought to make this region fairly safe, it represents possibilities which cannot be ignored.
The big attack which broke the Italian line on the Isonzo was begun early on Wednesday morning, and was evidently planned with the utmost skill. The reinforcing troops, both German and Austrian, are said to have been concentrated at Assling and at Laibach, and were brought up at night into the wild country east of the Upper Isonzo, where there are no railways and few roads. An Austrian corps attacked from Plezzo, and a German corps struck with irresistible weight through Caporetto. Another German corps advanced from the bridgehead which the enemy have always retained across the Isonzo below Tolmino. Meanwhile an overwhelming bombardment of the Italian positions on the Bainsizza Plateau was simultaneously begun, while farther south the Italians were attacked on the western slopes of Monte San Gabriele, immediately north-east of Gorizia.
The whole operation bears marks of exclusively German inspiration, and for once in a way the German method of massed attack carried everything before it. By Thursday morning Monte Matajur, at the head of the Natisone Valley, had been taken, and thereafter the Italians seem to have been overwhelmed. When the Natisone Valley was penetrated com- munications with Gorizia were clearly in danger of being severed, and apparently on Saturday afternoon General Cadorna prudently decided to evacuate the city. The Italian withdrawal from the Bainsizza Plateau had begun much earlier. Late last night the Germans declared that their pursuit was “advancing rapidly from the mountains as far as the sea,” and they claimed to have taken 100,000 prisoners and over 700 guns. These claims may be exaggerated, but every fresh message increases the impression of the undoubted magnitude of the disaster.
General Cadorna says he is withdrawing his line, and though strong reinforcements are understood to be reaching him, he may have to go a considerable distance. At Cividale on Saturday night the Germans were within ten miles of Udine, which is not only the Italian General Headquarters, but the focus of all the roads and railways traversing the country east of the Tagliamento.
It has often been said, and never with more truth than at this moment, that the Allied Front is one single line. In the truest sense the Isonzo is our front as much as the Somme and the Lys. Now that it has collapsed, we must do our best without delay to repair it. There is no need for alarm, but there is the utmost need for promptitude and broadness of vision, qualities which were not conspicuous in the Allied camps when in 1915 and 1916 the Germans were making their now annual autumnal incursion in search of food and plunder. Italy must not share the fate of Rumania and Serbia. The issue must be faced swiftly, for every fresh telegram deepens the consciousness of Italy’s peril.
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The immediate results unfortunately are already grievous enough. The enemy have burst through on almost the whole line of the Middle and Upper Isonzo. They have poured down the Natisone Valley, and, having entered on Saturday night the town of Cividale del Friuli (which was in flames), they must have been debouching on the Friulian plain yesterday morning. As a consequence Gorizia has been evacuated, though according to the last accounts Monte San Michele and the Valonne positions on the Carso are still being held by our Allies. In the face of a transformation so sweeping and complete it seems useless to examine in much detail the movements which have placed Italy in such grave danger.
The first sign of the impending onslaught was noticed on Monday, October 22, when the enemy’s artillery was unusually active on the Upper Isonzo. On Monday the Italians reported a strong Austro-German attack on Monte Piano, on the frontier of the Cadore, far to the north-west of the present great offensive. This announcement was highly significant. It was the first intimation of the presence of Germans on the Italian front, and we have still to see whether it portends a thrust from the Pustherthal as well as from the Isonzo. Monte Piano commands the Col St Angelo, over which runs the road leading to Auronzo and the Piave Valley, and though the lateness of the season ought to make this region fairly safe, it represents possibilities which cannot be ignored.
The big attack which broke the Italian line on the Isonzo was begun early on Wednesday morning, and was evidently planned with the utmost skill. The reinforcing troops, both German and Austrian, are said to have been concentrated at Assling and at Laibach, and were brought up at night into the wild country east of the Upper Isonzo, where there are no railways and few roads. An Austrian corps attacked from Plezzo, and a German corps struck with irresistible weight through Caporetto. Another German corps advanced from the bridgehead which the enemy have always retained across the Isonzo below Tolmino. Meanwhile an overwhelming bombardment of the Italian positions on the Bainsizza Plateau was simultaneously begun, while farther south the Italians were attacked on the western slopes of Monte San Gabriele, immediately north-east of Gorizia.
General Cadorna says he is withdrawing his line, and though strong reinforcements are understood to be reaching him, he may have to go a considerable distance. At Cividale on Saturday night the Germans were within ten miles of Udine, which is not only the Italian General Headquarters, but the focus of all the roads and railways traversing the country east of the Tagliamento.
It has often been said, and never with more truth than at this moment, that the Allied Front is one single line. In the truest sense the Isonzo is our front as much as the Somme and the Lys. Now that it has collapsed, we must do our best without delay to repair it. There is no need for alarm, but there is the utmost need for promptitude and broadness of vision, qualities which were not conspicuous in the Allied camps when in 1915 and 1916 the Germans were making their now annual autumnal incursion in search of food and plunder. Italy must not share the fate of Rumania and Serbia. The issue must be faced swiftly, for every fresh telegram deepens the consciousness of Italy’s peril.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-italian-retreat-5z9zz0ld6?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=newsletter_118&utm_medium=email&utm_content=118_December%2006,%202017&CMP=TNLEmail_118918_2619713_118
The Italian retreat
Our Allies have relinquished a series of positions won by hard and desperate endeavour during the last two years, at altitudes where military operations were extraordinarily difficult
November 7, 1917
The Germans claim that they have won the line of the Tagliamento, and, as usual, they obscure the fact that the bulk of the work must have been done by Austrians. The Italian bulletin does not completely confirm the enemy’s allegation, but there is no doubt that the claim is substantially correct. A bridgehead was secured on Monday at Pinzano, at the foot of the Venetian Alps, and scouting parties are said to have penetrated as far as Maniago.
These disclosures do niot in the least make the situation more disquieting, for it was never expected that General Cadorna could do more than offer a certain amount of obstruction to the passage of the Tagliamento. He is obviously fighting delaying rearguard actions until he is able to establish himself on the Middle and Lower Piave. Nor need we regard with alarm the German statement, which to some extent is anticipatory, that the Italians have abandoned their line in the Carnic Alps and the Dolomite region as far as the Colbricon mountain, a little south of the Travignolo Valley. This also was expected. Unfortunately, it means that our Allies have relinquished a series of positions won by hard and desperate endeavour during the last two years, at altitudes where military operations were extraordinarily difficult and could only have been carried to success by the exercise of the utmost courage and tenacity.
These disclosures do niot in the least make the situation more disquieting, for it was never expected that General Cadorna could do more than offer a certain amount of obstruction to the passage of the Tagliamento. He is obviously fighting delaying rearguard actions until he is able to establish himself on the Middle and Lower Piave. Nor need we regard with alarm the German statement, which to some extent is anticipatory, that the Italians have abandoned their line in the Carnic Alps and the Dolomite region as far as the Colbricon mountain, a little south of the Travignolo Valley. This also was expected. Unfortunately, it means that our Allies have relinquished a series of positions won by hard and desperate endeavour during the last two years, at altitudes where military operations were extraordinarily difficult and could only have been carried to success by the exercise of the utmost courage and tenacity.
All Allied nations will feel the deepest sympathy for the Italians in the temporary loss of this portion of their mountain line, But the step was inevitable, and by boldly facing it General Cadorna will materially improve his chances of stemming the tide of invasion. He will shorten his front, and will be far better able to utilize his depleted forces with telling effect. We may well grieve for the quiet and picturesque little cities which will pass for a time into the hands of the invaders, but the main necessity just now is to find an opportunity for the reorganization of the Italian Army. Signs are not lacking that the enemy may also attempt to debouch through the Trentino in order to fall on the Allied line of communications, but it is improbable that they can do so in great force, and if the move is made it will certainly be effectively countered.
For the present the threat against Venice can also be contemplated calmly. The enemy cannot very rapidly join issue on the Piave, and their communications are already far from easy. Meanwhile Allied help is arriving, and the position should gradually change for the better. Our Rome Correspondent warns us today that time will be required to pull the Italian Army together, but the general tone of his message is hopeful, and he reduces to very limited proportions the unfavourable political symptoms visible among small sections of the Italian population. We trust that, with Allied assistance, General Cadorna will more than hold his own on the line of the Piave.
For the present the threat against Venice can also be contemplated calmly. The enemy cannot very rapidly join issue on the Piave, and their communications are already far from easy. Meanwhile Allied help is arriving, and the position should gradually change for the better. Our Rome Correspondent warns us today that time will be required to pull the Italian Army together, but the general tone of his message is hopeful, and he reduces to very limited proportions the unfavourable political symptoms visible among small sections of the Italian population. We trust that, with Allied assistance, General Cadorna will more than hold his own on the line of the Piave.
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