https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/register/the-moonlight-air-raid-km9h7nfds
The first intimation was given by the sound of distant gunfire. At about 11.30pm the droning of enemy aeroplane engines could be heard. Many people thought that Zeppelins were approaching, for the raiders were big machines, probably Gothas. The Gotha’s twin engines, with cylinders firing twice as many to the minute as a single-engine machine, make a droning sound quite unlike the machine-gun effect of a single rotary or vertical motor.
When the first plane showed up anti-aircraft guns came into action. That the targets were very high was evident, for it was possible to count five or six seconds between the report of the gun and the time when the flash of the bursting shells could be seen. British aeroplanes went up in large numbers, but with little success, for one of the chief guides as to the locality of the bombing machines is denied a defending pilot, in that he cannot hear the enemy engine over the noise of his own.
At the first sound of gunfire many people rushed for shelter. Those nearer the tubes went to the stations in all stages of undress and were conveyed in the lifts to the underground platforms. Others, infinitely more foolish, stood in clusters in the open streets and watched the bombardment. Guests in evening dress just returned from the theatres, others in scanty attire with dressing gowns and overcoats over their night clothes, streamed downstairs, where they waited until the last raider had disappeared.
Many theatre-goers on their way home, noticing the pathetic crowds of women and children on the stations underground, wisely waited below. Stations on the Hampstead line were very congested.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/past-six-days/2017-09-05/register/the-fall-of-riga-7cfhdprzb
As on previous occasions, portions of the Army failed when the enemy struck. Some of the regiments bolted without orders, the rest had to fall back to avoid destruction or capture. The further intentions of the enemy can only be surmised. They may have entered Riga merely in order to winter there, instead of shivering on the other side of the marshes as in the last two winters. They will hardly be checked by troops whose constancy has been undermined by “committees”, who will neither fight nor obey, and who attend “political classes” for three hours daily.
In the West there has been far too much expectation of a miraculous restoration of Russia’s fighting capacity. We have been told that Russia has a resilience under adversity which we Western nations do not possess. No experienced soldier has lately shared these rosy hopes, for armies which have sunk to the depths of degradation reached by the Russian troops take a long time and iron discipline to recover their manhood.
The true cause of Russia’s military failure is the baneful activity of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils, composed of soldiers who are unwilling to fight and of “workmen” who have never worked in their lives. There can be little hope of the regeneration of Russia while the Soviet usurps the authority of the Provisional Government and while “committees and commissaries” flourish in what from courtesy must still be called “the fighting line”.
The blackest feature of the situation is that over the whole of Russia broods the shadow of imminent famine, due less to lack of food than to the breakdown of transport and to the absence of an organized system of distribution. The Allies must frankly face the effect of the Russian collapse upon the general military situation. There is still time for Russia to atone for the folly and the slackness of the last six months, but meanwhile the military consequences are immediate.
september 6, 1917
The moonlight air raid
It cannot be said that Londoners were unprepared for Tuesday night’s air raid. The sorties towards the coast on previous nights showed that the Germans had realized the possibility of raids during the full moon. During the evening there was talk in trains and tubes of a raid, and people on the way home from the theatres discussed the subject. Indeed, when the theatregoers were on their way home the first sounds of firing came from the outskirts of London. Watched from a high point in Hampstead, which overlooks the whole city as far as the Tower Bridge and the Crystal Palace, the raid was spectacular and particularly noisy.The first intimation was given by the sound of distant gunfire. At about 11.30pm the droning of enemy aeroplane engines could be heard. Many people thought that Zeppelins were approaching, for the raiders were big machines, probably Gothas. The Gotha’s twin engines, with cylinders firing twice as many to the minute as a single-engine machine, make a droning sound quite unlike the machine-gun effect of a single rotary or vertical motor.
When the first plane showed up anti-aircraft guns came into action. That the targets were very high was evident, for it was possible to count five or six seconds between the report of the gun and the time when the flash of the bursting shells could be seen. British aeroplanes went up in large numbers, but with little success, for one of the chief guides as to the locality of the bombing machines is denied a defending pilot, in that he cannot hear the enemy engine over the noise of his own.
At the first sound of gunfire many people rushed for shelter. Those nearer the tubes went to the stations in all stages of undress and were conveyed in the lifts to the underground platforms. Others, infinitely more foolish, stood in clusters in the open streets and watched the bombardment. Guests in evening dress just returned from the theatres, others in scanty attire with dressing gowns and overcoats over their night clothes, streamed downstairs, where they waited until the last raider had disappeared.
Many theatre-goers on their way home, noticing the pathetic crowds of women and children on the stations underground, wisely waited below. Stations on the Hampstead line were very congested.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/past-six-days/2017-09-05/register/the-fall-of-riga-7cfhdprzb
september 5, 1917
The fall of Riga
The incontinent abandonment by the Russian Army of the great city and port of Riga and of the Dvina front is of grave significance to the Allied cause. General Korniloff’s prediction at Moscow has been fulfilled in a week. He said that “if our Army does not help us to hold the Gulf of Riga the road to Petrograd will be opened wide.”As on previous occasions, portions of the Army failed when the enemy struck. Some of the regiments bolted without orders, the rest had to fall back to avoid destruction or capture. The further intentions of the enemy can only be surmised. They may have entered Riga merely in order to winter there, instead of shivering on the other side of the marshes as in the last two winters. They will hardly be checked by troops whose constancy has been undermined by “committees”, who will neither fight nor obey, and who attend “political classes” for three hours daily.
In the West there has been far too much expectation of a miraculous restoration of Russia’s fighting capacity. We have been told that Russia has a resilience under adversity which we Western nations do not possess. No experienced soldier has lately shared these rosy hopes, for armies which have sunk to the depths of degradation reached by the Russian troops take a long time and iron discipline to recover their manhood.
The true cause of Russia’s military failure is the baneful activity of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils, composed of soldiers who are unwilling to fight and of “workmen” who have never worked in their lives. There can be little hope of the regeneration of Russia while the Soviet usurps the authority of the Provisional Government and while “committees and commissaries” flourish in what from courtesy must still be called “the fighting line”.
The blackest feature of the situation is that over the whole of Russia broods the shadow of imminent famine, due less to lack of food than to the breakdown of transport and to the absence of an organized system of distribution. The Allies must frankly face the effect of the Russian collapse upon the general military situation. There is still time for Russia to atone for the folly and the slackness of the last six months, but meanwhile the military consequences are immediate.


