Wednesday 29 August 2018

This Week in History - Second Manassas (25-31 August 1862)

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Since 'Jeb' Stuart's raid behind the Union lines on 22-3 August there had been skirmishes and manoeuvring along the Rappahannock and, in the early hours of 25 August, Robert E Lee had launched 'Stonewall' Jackson on a bold, 56-mile flanking march. By midnight on August 26 Stuart had captured Manassas Junction and by morning most of the rest of Jackson's force were feasting on the massive Union supply depot there and destroying what they couldn't carry away. Jackson then withdrew to what he himself described as a 'commanding position' by the village of Groveton, waiting for Lee and James Longstreet to link up with him, having followed the route he had taken. He was also ready for the full Union response to his presence in what had been their rear. The expected clash took place on August 28, a fierce prelude to the main battle, in which the Stonewall Brigade reinforced their reputation and the Iron Brigade first established theirs.

On August 29 Jackson's corps was positioned in a strong defensive line along the workings of an unfinished railroad. Fierce attacks were met with equally fierce defence and the Confederates were pushed back but not broken. In one of the several spectacular misjudgements that lost him this campaign and his command, the Union General John Pope wrote a despatch early the next morning claiming victory in a 'terrific battle … which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy.' In fact, with Lee and Longstreet now on the scene and placing a fresh corps most threateningly on his left flank, it was Pope who was to be driven from the field on 30 August.

The first day's fighting had been inconclusive although Pope thought he had the Confederates beaten. However, Lee had brilliantly executed his strategy of forcing a confrontation at a place of his choosing with the Army of Virginia, before it could be reinforced and lengthen the odds against him to two-to-one. He had also fulfilled his purpose of drawing the war away from the Confederate capital and positioning himself to take it into Union territory. 

On the morning of the second day Lee had set a trap and the confident Pope blundered straight into it. Lee's line was now in the shape of a V, Jackson's corps along the unfinished railroad as before and Longstreet's corps angled off to its right. The final stage
 of the battle is described in the extract below.




Broń strzelecka z czasów wojny secesyjnej (od lewej): karabinek z konfederackiej wytwórni w Columbus wz. 1858, karabin odtylcowy Sharps Berdan wz. 1859, karabin powtarzalny Henry'ego wz. 1860, karabin piechoty Colta wz. 1861

Gen. Robert E. Lee 
Sierżant Unii z 18. regimentu pieszego z Pensylwanii w mundurze polowym, uzbrojony w karabin kapiszonowy Enfield z bagnetem tulejkowym i rewolwer Smith & Wesson 2 wz. 1860


Confederacki kawalerzysta z oddziału ochotników z Wirginii (London Cavarly) uzbrojony w rewolwer kapiszonowy Remington wz. 1858 kal. 44 i szablę M1850

Gen. John Pope, w 1862 r. dowódca Armii Wirginii, której podporządkowano część jednostek Armii Potomaku
Fortyfikacje konfederatów podczas drugiej bitwy pod Bull Run, sierpień 1862 r.

Dowódcy jednostek konfederackiej Armii Pólnocnej Wirginii (od góry): Ambrose Powell Hill, James Longstreet, Thomas Jonathan „Stonewall” Jackson, John Bell Hood



Further Reading

Campaign 95:  Second Manassas 1862 Robert E Lee's Greatest Victory (extract below) is a powerful account of the battle of Second Manassas. Campaign 32: Antietam 1862 The Civil War's Bloodiest Day covers Lee's Maryland campaign and the bloody battle of Antietam that followed close upon Second Manassas. Essential Histories 4: The American Civil War (1) The war in the East 1861-May 1863 covers the first half of the war in the east up to the battle of Chancellorsville when, once again, a Union commander failed to exploit the superior numbers at his disposal. Warrior 6: Confederate Infantryman 1861-65, Warrior 13: Union Cavalryman 1861-65, Warrior 31: Union Infantryman 1861-65 and Warrior 54: Confederate Cavalryman 1861-65, portray the training, everyday life and battle experiences of the cavalrymen and infantrymen of each side with detailed information on uniforms, equipment, weaponry and tactics. Warrior 60: Sharpshooters of the American Civil War 1861-65(extract below) focuses on the highly trained marksmen and skirmishers deployed on each side. Warrior 34: Confederate Artilleryman 1861-65is about the Confederate artilleryman and New Vanguard 38: American Civil War Artillery 1861-65 (1) Field Artillery and New Vanguard 40: American Civil War Artillery 1861-65 (2) Heavy Artillery examine the history, design and deployment of the guns he served.


An extract from Campaign 95: Second Manassas 1862 Robert E Lee's Greatest Victory

Second Manassas: Day 2

It was 3.00pm, however, before Porter's 10,000 troops were ready to advance. Pope was finally ready to throw his entire army into the breach. From left to right were the brigades of Henry Weeks, Charles Roberts, and Hatch, while US Army regulars under Sykes formed the reserve. 

The signal was given and Porter's men rushed forward, wheeling on their left. Members of Hiram Berdan's Sharpshooters in their green uniforms and carrying Sharps rifles moved out at 2.30pm, negotiating fences that ran along the Groveton-Sudley road. Before long they began skirmishing with men of Starke's Brigade, who had taken up position at a place known as The Dump. For 30 minutes they exchanged fire with their Rebel opponents, supported by two New York regiments. 

Men of the 24th and 30th New York were also on the move. Holding the Federal right they withstood heavy Confederate fire. One of them recorded the savage shouts and the pandemonium as they faced their determined foe. In the process they were "transformed from the time, from a lot of good-natured boys to the most blood-thirsty demonics." The New Yorkers made it to the opposite side of the railroad embankment where their Louisiana opponents blazed away at them, ultimately driving the Northerners back down the embankment. 

Roberts and Weeks fared no better, although according to one Confederate they began their advance "in magnificent style, lines as straight as an arrow, all fringed with glittering bayonets and fluttering flags." Before long though there were piles of Union bodies strewn all over the quarter-mile that lay between them and the Confederates. When they finally reached the Virginians they faced a devastating volley and were "blown away" according to one of the Southern defenders.

The dead and dying on both sides were scattered everywhere. As Porter closed in across the open field, his left was exposed to the Rebel-masked batteries. Southern shot and shell swept through his lines. Porter's attack staggered, while Longstreet opened with three batteries upon his left rear. Even then the Union men refused to give way. Jackson's troops, who had marched more than 50 miles in the past day and a half and withstood the onslaught of the previous day, were taking casualties as well. With Jackson under pressure, Lee ordered Longstreet to close in upon the Federal left. The order was superfluous because his veteran soldiers had already reached the same conclusion. Without waiting for word from their commander, they leaped forward, swinging on their left. Lee rode out in front of them as Jackson's men on the left also counter-attacked, accelerating the rout of the Federal army. The Confederate batteries soon joined in the rushing charge and were abreast of their infantry comrades all along the lines. According to one eyewitness Longstreet's gunners poured "solid shot, shell and sections" of cut up railroad track into the oncoming Federals. The results were devastating, and casualties mounted as Porter threw in more troops, who at one point came on in such numbers and so bunched up that one Southern defender claimed it was "impossible to miss them." The Rebels poured on a torrential fire and as a Confederate riflemen reported, "What a slaughter of men that was." 

This was more than the Yankees could bear. Although Jackson's forces were nearly at breaking point, and in the case of Stafford and Johnson's brigades, were all but out of ammunition, Porter cancelled the attack of his second line. The final blow came when Charles Field's Virginia Brigade arrived to support the beleaguered Confederate line. His unit's appearance caused Porter's troops to flee in a "disorderly rout" in masses, followed by the men of Jackson's old division from his right, who leaped across their defenses and chased them in hot pursuit. Pope's fierce attacks on Jackson's left had, in the meantime, also been repulsed. Jeb Stuart, on the right, along the old Alexandria Road, heard the famed Rebel Yell in pursuit. He rushed his brigades and batteries far in advance against the Federal left. Union General Gouverneur Warren attempted to stem the tide just east of Groveton, but at tremendous expense. Five of Hood's regiments attacked the 5th and 10th New York regiments of Warren's line. The New Yorkers deployed their skirmishers as Hood's veterans "yelling all the while" fell upon their outgunned prey. Alfred Davenport, a member of the 5th, recounted the chaos of this moment. First the recruits began to give way, then the entire regiment "broke and ran for their lives … There was no hope but in flight." As Davenport joined his fleeing comrades he "saw men dropping on all sides, canteens struck and flying to pieces, haversacks cut off, rifles knocked to pieces, it was a perfect hail of bullets." 

When it was over the 5th New Yorkers in their brightly colored red and blue Zouave uniforms were in the words of one observer strewn on the ground like a "posy garden". Within ten desperate minutes of being set upon by Hood's killing machine, the 5th New York, as historian Will Green points out, had lost more men killed "than any other regiment would lose in a single battle during the entire Civil War. 

In the meantime, survivors from Porter's ill-fated attack fell back into Groveton Woods, even as Sigel's Corps and units under Milroy tried to hold fast and prevent a complete collapse on this part of the field. 

Meanwhile, on the Union left, Schenck hung on to Bald Hill, but the determined Confederates swarmed upon his flank and forced him from the summit. Hood swept the line of the turnpike to the west of the Stone House. Pope's reserves, on Henry Hill, the focus of the fighting at Manassas the year before, resisted the onslaught for a time. But Jackson's left closed upon the retreating Federals toward the Stone Bridge until darkness put an end to his advance. Sigel and McDowell had fought a delaying action on Chinn Ridge but their regiments had been committed piecemeal and they were ultimately overwhelmed and forced to retire. This did, however, give Pope's demoralized brigades an opportunity to follow the crowd of fugitives that, long before the sun went down, crowded over that bridge, seeking safety behind the earthworks at Centreville and William B. Franklin's Corps, then advancing from Alexandria. 

The two days at Manassas cost Pope perhaps as many as 13,824 of his men, killed, wounded, and missing. He had also lost 30 pieces of artillery and many thousands of military stores and small arms worth millions of dollars in value. This great victory at Manassas cost Lee 1,305 killed and 7,048 wounded, mostly in Jackson's command, including many fine officers.



An extract from Warrior 60: Sharpshooters of the American Civil War 1861-65

Union Sharpshooters in action
In battle the sharpshooters were generally used as Berdan originally planned, in small groups no larger than one or two companies. New commander Charles Mattocks wrote home in March 1864, on taking command of the 1st U.S.S.S., to say their function was to "go ahead and 'kick up the muss"'.

Private William Kent wrote home on July 28, 1862 from Harrison Landing, Virginia, about his first combat experience: 
We piled our knapsacks and blankets and then formed the line of skirmishers in the edge of the woods, parallel with the valley, and then advanced down the hill, through the swamp and up the other side to the edge of the woods where we could see the approach of the rebels. … The "ninth" [Massachusetts] was now drawn in behind us, and drawn back half way up the hill on our side, where we took cover behind trees and stumps, and so watched until 3 P.M.
Then a brisk firing commenced on our right [the battle of Gaines' Mill] and scattered along until it come opposite of me. Tremendous volley of small arms, and the peal of heavy guns were the last things I heard before I went in. We fought pretty much on our own hook the officers being far to the right, and the human voice was of no account. The rebels rushed down the hill in line of battle, but it wasn't quite so easy rushing across a swamp, waist deep in thick mud, and as they tried it we tried Sharp's rifles at eight rods, firing as fast as we could put in cartridges, the distance being so short that aim was unnecessary. We couldn't help hitting them and our vigorous fire held them in check for some minutes - minutes are hours at such a time - and they were thrown into some disorder. Meanwhile, things were not very still. The bullets came like hair, and the trees looked like nutmeg graters, but our cover was pretty good and their aim, feet too high, so that our company lost only one killed and three wounded.

After the campaign was done, he added, "As far as I can remember I was perfectly cool, though sometimes I had a most ardent desire to try my legs, instead of my eyes, and I would have to pray most earnestly for strength, to do my duty. I did not exactly like to say, 'Oh God, help me to shoot that man' but substituted 'do my duty' and shot at men as well as I knew how."

This became the standard method of combat for the sharpshooters. Lieutenant Thomas Connington, Company K, 1st USSS, wrote home:
If the Gen. commanding has an idea the enemy is in a certain place and don't know their strength or position exactly, he orders skirmishers thrown out and in our corps it comes on the Sharpshooters because we have better guns and have drilled more in that than anything else.
It depends upon the front they want to cover as to the number thrown out, sometimes one or two Co's and sometimes half the Regt. always saving half the Regt. as reserve. Those thrown out deploy 5 paces apart and move forward in line, always keeping that together. We advance cautiously and are allowed to take the advantage of trees, stumps or anything that will make a cover.

Captain C.A. Stevens later described how skirmish warfare changed the role of the individual soldier in warfare: 
Going into action as skirmishers five paces apart (oftener ten), and frequently in brushy places of thickets out of sight of the comrade right and left, often far ahead of the regular battle line, each man looking out for himself, making of each skirmisher a separate and distinctive body or force, taking the place in a measure of a company, is a performance that brings out to the fullest intensity all the perceptive qualities of the individual; while the enemy in the largest possible formation, watches this isolated skirmisher with the same degree of interest for the time being, as they do afterwards the approaching columns. So that the skirmisher becomes a very much noted character in spite of himself.

Their Confederate opponents were well aware the sharpshooters' abilities, and treated them with great respect. Private Alexander Hunder, 17th Virginia Infantry, recalled their being across the lines from their defenses at Williamsburg in 1862. "Some of these sharpshooters had holes dug in the ground close to our trenches, within which they had every comfort, while they kept a close and constant watch over us. We used to place a hat on a stick and lift it above the embankment just to see them put a bullet in it," he wrote. "We lost in the Seventeenth, by these sharpshooters during our occupancy of the trenches, a sergeant killed, one private killed, and two wounded."

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