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The Allied advance continued,
October 1918
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This week's chapter
examines the position at the beginning of OCtober 1918, the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line attacked, October 3, American progress in the
Argonne, Gouraud's success at Moronvillers, Reims freed, great British attack
of October 8 between Cambrai and St Quentin, the fall of Cambrai, Germans
evacuate the St Gobain Salient, German stand on the Selle, Le Cateau stormed,
the enemy defeated in Champagne, La Fere and Laon taken, Americans reach
Grand Pre, Allied offensive in Flanders under King Albert, Roulers taken, the
Lys crossed, war in the air
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The enemy's discipline was fast deteriorating, as had been
revealed by an intercepted order from the Kaiser's Adjutant General to the
German Army: "His Majesty the Kaiser," it ran, "is displeased
to note that when he is passing through villages, along roads, by a railway
crossing, and so forth, the troops fail to pay him the necessary respect, and
the inhabitants fail to greet him in the proper way by removing their
headgear. This must be seen to."
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The right
answer to Germany
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Let it never be said
again that the British Army is admirable only in defence and has not the
spirit of attack
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The news from France is the best of all answers to the German Note. Both on the western and on the eastern battle-fronts the Allied attacks were renewed yesterday morning. On the western front the attack covered the space of nearly twenty miles between Cambrai and St Quentin, and made a further progress of between two and three miles - greater in the centre than on the flanks - on a part of the enemy’s line where his defences had already been ruptured. The centre of our advance is now approaching Le Cateau, the scene of General Smith Dorriens severe, and perhaps unnecessary, engagement on the third day of the retreat from Mons. French, American, and British troops all took part in this new advance. On the east the French and Americans attacked down the right bank of the Meuse, and, though details are still lacking, made good progress towards the north. In addition, General Gouraud, continuing his advance in Champagne, crossed the Arnes and turned the enemy’s positions along the Suippe River from the eastern end. One cannot but marvel at the energy of these repeated attacks and the magnificent scope of the strategic plan that they unfold. And one may be pardoned for expressing especial admiration for the vigour and endurance of our own Army, which has been engaged in practically continuous fighting on this Western front ever since the opening of the Somme offensive in July, 1916. Except for the retreat in the spring of this year, the whole of this fighting has been in the attack. Let it never be said again that the British Army is admirable only in defence and has not the spirit of attack. On the contrary, though the record of the French Army is in some respects even more wonderful, there is no Army - not even the German - that has achieved so long and so sustained an offensive. For an Army that really did not exist on a Continental scale until the year before last this is an achievement that is still not appreciated here at its full value. It is not altogether out of French politeness that our Allies rute it higher than we sometimes seem to do.
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But even more remarkable than the duration of the offensive is the strategic splendour of its plan. Nothing that the Germans did even in their first campaign in France or on the Russian front later can approach it. The metaphor of the pincers is familiar and intelligible, but never was there anything in war to compare with the strategic mechanism, elaborate but never complicated, of Marshal Foch’s pincers. You have enveloping movements one within the other. Inside you have the envelopment of the German centre in progress in the combined operations north of St Quentin on the one hand and on the Chemin des Dames on the other. Then you have on the western arm of the pincers the enveloping movement against Lille, and on the eastern arm the combined movements of French and Americans in Champagne and the Argonne against Vouziers and the Defile of Grand Pre. Lastly, still farther out, you have the great enveloping movements, still rudimentary, out from Ypres and down the Meuse. The bigness of the design is now apparent. How big it is may be gathered from the reflection that the great offensives reported today - the movements that threaten the German centre in the Laon-Le Fere hills, and the movement in that eastern section north of Verdun which perhaps promises the most decisive results of all - are only three out of many cogwheels in this vast machinery of constriction.
These renewed attacks, then, are our reply to the German request for an armistice, and a reply that expresses the sentiment of armies and civilians alike. But, however successful our attacks, they cannot in one respect be a complete answer to the German peace offensive. The enemy’s retreat will be through the country of our Allies, and if we may judge by what has happened at Douai, at Lens, and at Laon, hie means to go out with arson as he came in with assault and battery. Even that does not quite plumb the depravity of the enemy’s conduct, for he has made this policy of unmilitary destruction and devastation a part of his peace propaganda - as who should say, Give me the advantages of a truce, or I will burn and destroy everything in my retreat. It is a species of blackmail, both cruel and mean. Now, no military success can quite combat the enemy’s power if he wishes to commit outrage of this kind; and (unless indeed we were able to prevent the enemy from retreating at all, and to accomplish some comprehensive Sedan in the heart of’ the territories that he at present occupies) we are faced with the prospect of marching to victory over the blackened ruin of all that civilization has achieved in beauty or utility.
For special crimes special punishments have to be devised. This barbarous destruction must be made demonstrably unprofitable, and that in a currency of punishment that even the coarsest minds cannot fail to understand. If the enemy destroys cities in France and Belgium, then cities in Germany must suffer the penalty. Eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, town for town.
The Allies must protect themselves from the purely wanton forms of wickedness. General threats of reprisals do not seem to us to meet the situation. They should be specific in their nature, and should be relentlessly carried out should the enemy’s malpractices continue after notice has been given. If Bruges is destroyed, either by the enemy’s arson or as the result of a hopeless defence, then Hamburg must pay; if Lille, then Frankfurt. The payment need not necessarily take the same form as the crime, but the Germans quite understand the practice of taking hostages for good behaviour. German towns must be marked down for ransom for French and Belgian towns destroyed apart from military necessity.













