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The battle of Nicopolis was the end of the crusades, but also the first encounter between the Ottoman Turks and the soldiers of western Europe. During the second half of the 14th century, the rapid spread of Ottoman Turkish conquests, and particularly the Ottoman threat to Hungary, was causing great consternation in western Europe. Further provocation was provided by the siege of Constantinople, the last remnant of the Byzantine Empire, in 1391 by Sultan Bãyazîd I 'The Lightning'. Pope Boniface IX preached a crusade and soon an army of English, French, Germans, Italians and Knights Hospitallers under the leadership of John of Nevers, son of Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy marched east towards Constantinople, joining a Hungarian army under King Sigismund of Hungary on the way. They advanced deep into new Turkish territory, but were halted at the town of Nicopolis, which resisted the Crusader siege for over two weeks.
Sultan Bãyazîd decided to march to the town's rescue. He chose a defensive position straddling the road to the city with his flanks protected by ravines. Sigismund advised a cautious approach, but the western crusaders would have none of that. Instead, they charged straight at the Ottomans. After a fierce battle, the Ottomans were victorious. It was a devastating loss for the Crusaders, particularly as Bãyazîd, enraged by his heavy losses, slaughtered most of his prisoners the next day.
Further reading
For the full story of the last crusade, Campaign 64: Nicopolis 1396 The last Crusade (extract below) is a detailed account. Campaign 132: The First Crusade 1096-99 Conquest of the Holy Land is a new book giving the account of the very first crusade, three hundred years previously. To set Nicopolis against its background of three centuries of crusading, Essential Histories 1: The Crusades gives an overview of the entire period, and discusses the causes, context and consequences of the Crusades. For the Ottoman perspective of Nicopolis, turn to Essential Histories 62: The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699. Finally, for more information about Hungary in the last Crusade, and the subsequent fortune of Eastern Europe, Men-at-Arms 195: Hungary and the fall of Eastern Europe 1000-1568 is a detailed study.
Men-at-Arms 75: Armies of the Crusades, Elite 19: The Crusades, Men-at-Arms 155: Knights of Christ, and Men-at-Arms 125: The Armies of Islam 7th-11th Centuries cover the various armies involved in the crusading period. For information about the specific armies at Nicopolis, turn to Warrior 41: Knight Hospitaller (2) 1306-1565, Men-at-Arms 144: Armies of Medieval Burgundy 1364-1477 and Men-at-Arms 140: Armies of the Ottoman Turks 1300-1774.
An extract from Campaign 64: Nicopolis 1396 The last Crusade
The battle of Nicopolis
The battle of Nicopolis was fought in Monday 25 September 1396 ad on open ground not far from the walls of the town. Bãyazîd was on slightly higher ground and used natural features to secure his position. His left flank was close to a wood while his right flank was protected by broken ground beyond which steep slopes led down to marshes along the Danube. Most important of all there was a narrow wooden ravine to his front.
The Ottoman array was relatively straightforward and fully within 14th-century Anatolian Turkish military traditions. These habitually placed infantry archers ahead of the main cavalry element, which was itself divided into a larger centre with smaller wings which could be thrust forwards, giving the whole array a crescent formation. As was also traditional, Balkan or Rumelian cavalry were placed on the right wing because this battle was on European soil. Anatolian cavalry was on the left. Infantry were in the centre protected by a deep thicket of sharpened wooden stakes. The few existing Janissary ortas were probably amongst the ordinary azap foot soldiers rather than being held back with Bãyazîd's household cavalry corps. In front of the stakes were light cavalry akincis, who were intended to draw the enemy forward against the main field defences and expose them to cavalry flank attacks. Meanwhile Bãyazîd was some distance to the rear behind the brow of the hill, surrounded by his personal guard and presumably with household regiments to right and left.
Bãyazîd planned to draw the Crusaders into an assault and then hit them in the flanks while they were fighting his infantry. However, the Franco-Burgundians broke through the Ottoman infantry more quickly than expected and they also attacked so precipitously that the Crusader army was effectively divided into two parts.
With the exception of King Sigismund's Wallachian and Transylvanian vassals, the morale of both armies was high, but when it came to discipline things were different. Like most Western European armies, the Crusaders were not specifically trained to cope with a reversal. The Ottomans were, and as a result they did not run away when beaten. Instead they re-formed behind their original positions. Nor did the Crusader army rush headlong into battle 'hot with wine and courage' as has been suggested. Its leaders had hurried from their evening banquet to an acrimonious discussion the previous evening, but the morrow's battle array had been agreed. Sigismund advised caution and, supported by De Coucy, wanted to discover whether Bãyazîd was going to attack. He also wanted to send Transylvanian and Wallachian light cavalry to clear the field of akincis. The French and Burgundian men-at-arms would then attack the Ottoman main force, supported by the Hungarians and other Crusaders. Many of the Franco-Burgundian leaders were furious at the idea of entering battle behind those they regarded as peasants, and the Count d'Eu is even said to have declared: 'Yes, yes, the King of Hungary wants to have the flowers of the day and the honour!'
Sigismund gave way and the following morning the Franco-Burgundians took up their position at the front of the army. Behind them, along a broader front, were the Hungarians, Germans, Hospitallers, and probably Bohemians and Poles. On the right were the Transylvanians led by Laczkovic and on the left were the Wallachians led by Mircea. This meant that the Crusaders' left flank rested near the slope leading down to the Danube while their right flank was not far from the head of two ravines which ran beneath the western wall of Nicopolis.
Early on the morning of 25 September, Sigismund sent his Grand Marshal to urge his allies not to advance too hastily from what was a good defensive position. The Count of Nevers now summoned his advisors. De Coucy agreed with Sigismund's advice, but D'Eu seized a banner of the Virgin and shouted: 'Forward in the name of God and St. George, today you shall see me a valorous knight'. The experienced De Coucy was horrified and turned to the Admiral de Vienne, who, perhaps with a Gallic shrug, replied: 'When truth and reason cannot be heard, then must arrogance rule'. Still they advised waiting for the Hungarians but D'Eu insisted on an immediate advance. Doubts concerning men's courage were exchanged and no one wanted to be shamed, so the attack was launched. D'Eu commanded the van, with the Count of Nevers, De Coucy and the main body close behind. Knights, squires and a small number of mounted infantry moved forward together, along with some German and other Crusaders including a few Wallachians.
The only Ottoman troops visible to Crusader scouting parties were light cavalry akincis on the slope of a hill beyond a narrow, wooded ravine. They are said to have obscured the thicket of sharpened stakes and Ottoman infantry beyond.
Perhaps believing the European myth that Turkish armies consisted of lightly equipped horsemen, the Franco-Burgundian contingent moved forward towards the edge of the plateau without informing Sigismund. It was not the function of akincis to confront a mass of heavily armoured horsemen and any fighting would have been little more than skirmishing. European chronicles maintain that this ill-equipped Ottoman light cavalry scattered and thus exposed the Ottoman infantry behind a thicket of sharpened stakes. In reality the akincis
would probably have shot a few volleys of arrows, drawn the enemy forward and then broken away around the flanks to re-form.
At this point the Franco-Burgundians paused briefly, perhaps taken aback by a steep slope topped by a forest of sharpened stakes and great numbers of infantry drawn up in two large blocs. Today the trees and bushes do not extend up the far side of the ravine and it is easy to imagine that the Crusaders presented the Ottoman infantry archers with a superb target. Crusader chronicles make it abundantly clear that arrows poured down upon the Franco-Burgundians. Boucicault told his men to press ahead and avoid a 'coward's death' from an arrow.
The question of whether the Crusaders now dismounted to climb the slope and uproot the stakes or broke through on horseback is probably misleading and assumes much too much control by the commanders over their men. The slope was steep and in places almost precipitous. Many horses would have been wounded by arrows and thrown their riders. All sources agree that these horses made their own way back to the Crusader camp. As a result many unhorsed Crusaders would have continued up the slope on foot while others were still mounted. Those on foot would have wrenched at the sharpened stakes while Ottoman archers poured volley after volley into their ranks but were probably appalled to find that their arrows had less effect than anticipated. The Ottoman composite bow, though having greater range, accuracy and rate of shooting than the Western European longbow, shot notably lighter arrows and even longbow shafts rarely penetrated the armour that protected the vital organs.
Within a short time the Crusaders broke through the stakes and got amongst the largely unarmoured infantry. Since the French and Burgundians attacked on a relatively narrow front, the surviving Ottoman foot soldiers were probably forced to the flanks rather than fleeing uphill. Traditional Ottoman histories describe this as a trap into which the Crusaders fell - but if so it was a trap which nearly failed. The Franco-Burgundian corps also dispersed the Ottoman cavalry immediately behind the infantry; perhaps the akincis who had re-formed but probably including sipahîs guarding the gap between two infantry divisions.
After defeating the Ottoman infantry the aged De Coucy and De Vienne recommended a pause but the younger men, 'boiling with ardour', insisted on pressing ahead, perhaps expecting to find and pillage the Ottoman camp. Instead they were struck in the flanks by the provincial sipahîs. A desperate mêlée ensued in which those Crusaders fighting on foot attacked the enemy's horses with their daggers. Heavy casualties were suffered by both sides before the sipahîs withdrew to the flanks. All this happened on a steep slope in the blazing sun and by the time it was over the Crusaders, young and old, were tired if not exhausted. The Ottomans were proving tougher foes than anticipated while the French and Burgundians may have realised that the Hungarians were too far back to give immediate support. Nevertheless, they continued up the hill.
At this critical point Bãyazîd's household division appeared over the brow of the hill, shocking the Crusaders, who believed that they had already won the battle. Bãyazîd's cavalry elite crashed into the somewhat disorganised French and Burgundians and, in the words of the Monk of St. Denis: 'The lion in them turned into a timid hare'. Many fled down the hill back to the plateau, others down the ravine towards the Danube where they found broad marshes rather than the river they had seen only five kilometres upstream. The rest stood and fought. Not surprisingly Crusader chroniclers stress the prowess of their own men; French sources proclaiming that Boucicault, De Coucy, the two Sires de Trémoille, the young Count of Nevers and others were soon surrounded by mounds of slain.
Most Turkish sources merely state that the Ottomans closed in from three sides, which suggests that the provincial sipahîs rejoined the fight on the flanks. Perhaps basing his work on the recollections of Ottoman troops who took part in the battle, the Byzantine chronicler Dukas maintains that Bãyazîd's household troops emerged from a wooded area. Maps made earlier this century certainly indicate that there were many trees on the summit of the hill. The Ottoman chronicler Nesri based his work on statements by the sons of those who took part, stating that one part of the Crusader army fell into a panic, shouting 'The Turks are behind us! The Turks have got behind us!'
Old Admiral de Vienne tried to rally the Crusaders but only ten companions stood by him. Six times, it was said, the Banner of the Virgin was knocked down but raised again until finally the Admiral himself was beaten to the ground, the sacred banner in his lifeless hand. Among others who fell were Guillaume de la Trémoille and his son, Philippe de Bar, John of Cadzaud the Admiral of Flanders, the Sire de Montcavrel, Jean de Roye and, it was said, a Grand Prior of the Teutonic Knights. John of Nevers' bodyguard finally persuaded him to surrender. Thereupon the Comte d'Eu, the Comte de La Marche, Guy de la Trémoille, Marshal Boucicault and Enguerrand de Coucy also lay down their weapons, as did several Wallachian noblemen.
Western and Ottoman sources agree that the battle of Nicopolis was actually two battles in which the Ottomans destroyed the Franco-Burgundian and Hungarian Crusaders separately. The precise sequence of events is, however, unclear. Were the French defeated before the Hungarians came into contact, or did the two combats overlap? Sigismund may not have known the fate of his allies once the akincis re-formed and the Hungarian King's famous remark to Philibert de Naillac that: 'We lost the battle by the pride and vanity of those French. If they had believed my advice, we had enough men to fight our enemies,' was probably made towards the end of the battle. On the other hand the stream of wounded and riderless horses cantering back from out of the ravine did have an impact on Hungarian morale.
Sigismund, the Hungarians, Germans and other smaller Crusader contingents seem to have moved forward in a vain attempt to support the Franco-Burgundians, perhaps before the latter had surrendered. The Wallachians and Transylvanians were probably still with them and it may only have been when Ottoman troops emerged from the ravine that Mircea and Steven Laczkovic decided the day was lost. Neither man felt particular affection for Sigismund and both knew that their own territories would soon be raided by victorious Ottomans.
Meanwhile Sigismund's corps moved forward, cutting its way through a division of Ottoman infantry who can only have been the azaps previously broken by the Franco-Burgundians. The fact that they had re-formed confirms the discipline of the Ottoman army but quite where this clash took place is unknown.
After this success the Hungarians took on a body of Ottoman cavalry, probably the provincial sipahîs, who would have moved forward with their infantry. Bãyazîd's household division was probably not involved and the outcome was still in the balance when the Ottoman ruler sent Stefan Lazarevic and his Serbs into the fray. They charged towards the main Hungarian banner held by Nicholas de Gara's standard-bearer and overthrew it.
Some sources suggest that the Serbian attack was a form of ambush and may have been launched from a wooded area, probably around the head of the ravine since Stefan Lazarevic seems to have been stationed to the left of Bãyazîd's position. If so, it is likely to have hit the Hungarians in the flank or rear. The impact was decisive, as Schiltberger made clear: 'When all the [Turkish] foot soldiers were killed, the king advanced upon another corps which was of horse. When the Turkish king saw the king advancing, he was about to flee, but the Duke of Rascia [Serbia] known as the Despot, seeing this, went to the assistance of the Turkish king with 15,000 chosen men and many other bannerets. And the Despot threw himself with his people upon the King's banner and overturned it'.
The battle of Nicopolis was the end of the crusades, but also the first encounter between the Ottoman Turks and the soldiers of western Europe. During the second half of the 14th century, the rapid spread of Ottoman Turkish conquests, and particularly the Ottoman threat to Hungary, was causing great consternation in western Europe. Further provocation was provided by the siege of Constantinople, the last remnant of the Byzantine Empire, in 1391 by Sultan Bãyazîd I 'The Lightning'. Pope Boniface IX preached a crusade and soon an army of English, French, Germans, Italians and Knights Hospitallers under the leadership of John of Nevers, son of Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy marched east towards Constantinople, joining a Hungarian army under King Sigismund of Hungary on the way. They advanced deep into new Turkish territory, but were halted at the town of Nicopolis, which resisted the Crusader siege for over two weeks.
Sultan Bãyazîd decided to march to the town's rescue. He chose a defensive position straddling the road to the city with his flanks protected by ravines. Sigismund advised a cautious approach, but the western crusaders would have none of that. Instead, they charged straight at the Ottomans. After a fierce battle, the Ottomans were victorious. It was a devastating loss for the Crusaders, particularly as Bãyazîd, enraged by his heavy losses, slaughtered most of his prisoners the next day.
Further reading
For the full story of the last crusade, Campaign 64: Nicopolis 1396 The last Crusade (extract below) is a detailed account. Campaign 132: The First Crusade 1096-99 Conquest of the Holy Land is a new book giving the account of the very first crusade, three hundred years previously. To set Nicopolis against its background of three centuries of crusading, Essential Histories 1: The Crusades gives an overview of the entire period, and discusses the causes, context and consequences of the Crusades. For the Ottoman perspective of Nicopolis, turn to Essential Histories 62: The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699. Finally, for more information about Hungary in the last Crusade, and the subsequent fortune of Eastern Europe, Men-at-Arms 195: Hungary and the fall of Eastern Europe 1000-1568 is a detailed study.
Men-at-Arms 75: Armies of the Crusades, Elite 19: The Crusades, Men-at-Arms 155: Knights of Christ, and Men-at-Arms 125: The Armies of Islam 7th-11th Centuries cover the various armies involved in the crusading period. For information about the specific armies at Nicopolis, turn to Warrior 41: Knight Hospitaller (2) 1306-1565, Men-at-Arms 144: Armies of Medieval Burgundy 1364-1477 and Men-at-Arms 140: Armies of the Ottoman Turks 1300-1774.
An extract from Campaign 64: Nicopolis 1396 The last Crusade
The battle of Nicopolis
The battle of Nicopolis was fought in Monday 25 September 1396 ad on open ground not far from the walls of the town. Bãyazîd was on slightly higher ground and used natural features to secure his position. His left flank was close to a wood while his right flank was protected by broken ground beyond which steep slopes led down to marshes along the Danube. Most important of all there was a narrow wooden ravine to his front.
The Ottoman array was relatively straightforward and fully within 14th-century Anatolian Turkish military traditions. These habitually placed infantry archers ahead of the main cavalry element, which was itself divided into a larger centre with smaller wings which could be thrust forwards, giving the whole array a crescent formation. As was also traditional, Balkan or Rumelian cavalry were placed on the right wing because this battle was on European soil. Anatolian cavalry was on the left. Infantry were in the centre protected by a deep thicket of sharpened wooden stakes. The few existing Janissary ortas were probably amongst the ordinary azap foot soldiers rather than being held back with Bãyazîd's household cavalry corps. In front of the stakes were light cavalry akincis, who were intended to draw the enemy forward against the main field defences and expose them to cavalry flank attacks. Meanwhile Bãyazîd was some distance to the rear behind the brow of the hill, surrounded by his personal guard and presumably with household regiments to right and left.
Bãyazîd planned to draw the Crusaders into an assault and then hit them in the flanks while they were fighting his infantry. However, the Franco-Burgundians broke through the Ottoman infantry more quickly than expected and they also attacked so precipitously that the Crusader army was effectively divided into two parts.
With the exception of King Sigismund's Wallachian and Transylvanian vassals, the morale of both armies was high, but when it came to discipline things were different. Like most Western European armies, the Crusaders were not specifically trained to cope with a reversal. The Ottomans were, and as a result they did not run away when beaten. Instead they re-formed behind their original positions. Nor did the Crusader army rush headlong into battle 'hot with wine and courage' as has been suggested. Its leaders had hurried from their evening banquet to an acrimonious discussion the previous evening, but the morrow's battle array had been agreed. Sigismund advised caution and, supported by De Coucy, wanted to discover whether Bãyazîd was going to attack. He also wanted to send Transylvanian and Wallachian light cavalry to clear the field of akincis. The French and Burgundian men-at-arms would then attack the Ottoman main force, supported by the Hungarians and other Crusaders. Many of the Franco-Burgundian leaders were furious at the idea of entering battle behind those they regarded as peasants, and the Count d'Eu is even said to have declared: 'Yes, yes, the King of Hungary wants to have the flowers of the day and the honour!'
Sigismund gave way and the following morning the Franco-Burgundians took up their position at the front of the army. Behind them, along a broader front, were the Hungarians, Germans, Hospitallers, and probably Bohemians and Poles. On the right were the Transylvanians led by Laczkovic and on the left were the Wallachians led by Mircea. This meant that the Crusaders' left flank rested near the slope leading down to the Danube while their right flank was not far from the head of two ravines which ran beneath the western wall of Nicopolis.
Early on the morning of 25 September, Sigismund sent his Grand Marshal to urge his allies not to advance too hastily from what was a good defensive position. The Count of Nevers now summoned his advisors. De Coucy agreed with Sigismund's advice, but D'Eu seized a banner of the Virgin and shouted: 'Forward in the name of God and St. George, today you shall see me a valorous knight'. The experienced De Coucy was horrified and turned to the Admiral de Vienne, who, perhaps with a Gallic shrug, replied: 'When truth and reason cannot be heard, then must arrogance rule'. Still they advised waiting for the Hungarians but D'Eu insisted on an immediate advance. Doubts concerning men's courage were exchanged and no one wanted to be shamed, so the attack was launched. D'Eu commanded the van, with the Count of Nevers, De Coucy and the main body close behind. Knights, squires and a small number of mounted infantry moved forward together, along with some German and other Crusaders including a few Wallachians.
The only Ottoman troops visible to Crusader scouting parties were light cavalry akincis on the slope of a hill beyond a narrow, wooded ravine. They are said to have obscured the thicket of sharpened stakes and Ottoman infantry beyond.
Perhaps believing the European myth that Turkish armies consisted of lightly equipped horsemen, the Franco-Burgundian contingent moved forward towards the edge of the plateau without informing Sigismund. It was not the function of akincis to confront a mass of heavily armoured horsemen and any fighting would have been little more than skirmishing. European chronicles maintain that this ill-equipped Ottoman light cavalry scattered and thus exposed the Ottoman infantry behind a thicket of sharpened stakes. In reality the akincis
would probably have shot a few volleys of arrows, drawn the enemy forward and then broken away around the flanks to re-form.
At this point the Franco-Burgundians paused briefly, perhaps taken aback by a steep slope topped by a forest of sharpened stakes and great numbers of infantry drawn up in two large blocs. Today the trees and bushes do not extend up the far side of the ravine and it is easy to imagine that the Crusaders presented the Ottoman infantry archers with a superb target. Crusader chronicles make it abundantly clear that arrows poured down upon the Franco-Burgundians. Boucicault told his men to press ahead and avoid a 'coward's death' from an arrow.
The question of whether the Crusaders now dismounted to climb the slope and uproot the stakes or broke through on horseback is probably misleading and assumes much too much control by the commanders over their men. The slope was steep and in places almost precipitous. Many horses would have been wounded by arrows and thrown their riders. All sources agree that these horses made their own way back to the Crusader camp. As a result many unhorsed Crusaders would have continued up the slope on foot while others were still mounted. Those on foot would have wrenched at the sharpened stakes while Ottoman archers poured volley after volley into their ranks but were probably appalled to find that their arrows had less effect than anticipated. The Ottoman composite bow, though having greater range, accuracy and rate of shooting than the Western European longbow, shot notably lighter arrows and even longbow shafts rarely penetrated the armour that protected the vital organs.
Within a short time the Crusaders broke through the stakes and got amongst the largely unarmoured infantry. Since the French and Burgundians attacked on a relatively narrow front, the surviving Ottoman foot soldiers were probably forced to the flanks rather than fleeing uphill. Traditional Ottoman histories describe this as a trap into which the Crusaders fell - but if so it was a trap which nearly failed. The Franco-Burgundian corps also dispersed the Ottoman cavalry immediately behind the infantry; perhaps the akincis who had re-formed but probably including sipahîs guarding the gap between two infantry divisions.
After defeating the Ottoman infantry the aged De Coucy and De Vienne recommended a pause but the younger men, 'boiling with ardour', insisted on pressing ahead, perhaps expecting to find and pillage the Ottoman camp. Instead they were struck in the flanks by the provincial sipahîs. A desperate mêlée ensued in which those Crusaders fighting on foot attacked the enemy's horses with their daggers. Heavy casualties were suffered by both sides before the sipahîs withdrew to the flanks. All this happened on a steep slope in the blazing sun and by the time it was over the Crusaders, young and old, were tired if not exhausted. The Ottomans were proving tougher foes than anticipated while the French and Burgundians may have realised that the Hungarians were too far back to give immediate support. Nevertheless, they continued up the hill.
At this critical point Bãyazîd's household division appeared over the brow of the hill, shocking the Crusaders, who believed that they had already won the battle. Bãyazîd's cavalry elite crashed into the somewhat disorganised French and Burgundians and, in the words of the Monk of St. Denis: 'The lion in them turned into a timid hare'. Many fled down the hill back to the plateau, others down the ravine towards the Danube where they found broad marshes rather than the river they had seen only five kilometres upstream. The rest stood and fought. Not surprisingly Crusader chroniclers stress the prowess of their own men; French sources proclaiming that Boucicault, De Coucy, the two Sires de Trémoille, the young Count of Nevers and others were soon surrounded by mounds of slain.
Most Turkish sources merely state that the Ottomans closed in from three sides, which suggests that the provincial sipahîs rejoined the fight on the flanks. Perhaps basing his work on the recollections of Ottoman troops who took part in the battle, the Byzantine chronicler Dukas maintains that Bãyazîd's household troops emerged from a wooded area. Maps made earlier this century certainly indicate that there were many trees on the summit of the hill. The Ottoman chronicler Nesri based his work on statements by the sons of those who took part, stating that one part of the Crusader army fell into a panic, shouting 'The Turks are behind us! The Turks have got behind us!'
Old Admiral de Vienne tried to rally the Crusaders but only ten companions stood by him. Six times, it was said, the Banner of the Virgin was knocked down but raised again until finally the Admiral himself was beaten to the ground, the sacred banner in his lifeless hand. Among others who fell were Guillaume de la Trémoille and his son, Philippe de Bar, John of Cadzaud the Admiral of Flanders, the Sire de Montcavrel, Jean de Roye and, it was said, a Grand Prior of the Teutonic Knights. John of Nevers' bodyguard finally persuaded him to surrender. Thereupon the Comte d'Eu, the Comte de La Marche, Guy de la Trémoille, Marshal Boucicault and Enguerrand de Coucy also lay down their weapons, as did several Wallachian noblemen.
Western and Ottoman sources agree that the battle of Nicopolis was actually two battles in which the Ottomans destroyed the Franco-Burgundian and Hungarian Crusaders separately. The precise sequence of events is, however, unclear. Were the French defeated before the Hungarians came into contact, or did the two combats overlap? Sigismund may not have known the fate of his allies once the akincis re-formed and the Hungarian King's famous remark to Philibert de Naillac that: 'We lost the battle by the pride and vanity of those French. If they had believed my advice, we had enough men to fight our enemies,' was probably made towards the end of the battle. On the other hand the stream of wounded and riderless horses cantering back from out of the ravine did have an impact on Hungarian morale.
Sigismund, the Hungarians, Germans and other smaller Crusader contingents seem to have moved forward in a vain attempt to support the Franco-Burgundians, perhaps before the latter had surrendered. The Wallachians and Transylvanians were probably still with them and it may only have been when Ottoman troops emerged from the ravine that Mircea and Steven Laczkovic decided the day was lost. Neither man felt particular affection for Sigismund and both knew that their own territories would soon be raided by victorious Ottomans.
Meanwhile Sigismund's corps moved forward, cutting its way through a division of Ottoman infantry who can only have been the azaps previously broken by the Franco-Burgundians. The fact that they had re-formed confirms the discipline of the Ottoman army but quite where this clash took place is unknown.
After this success the Hungarians took on a body of Ottoman cavalry, probably the provincial sipahîs, who would have moved forward with their infantry. Bãyazîd's household division was probably not involved and the outcome was still in the balance when the Ottoman ruler sent Stefan Lazarevic and his Serbs into the fray. They charged towards the main Hungarian banner held by Nicholas de Gara's standard-bearer and overthrew it.
Some sources suggest that the Serbian attack was a form of ambush and may have been launched from a wooded area, probably around the head of the ravine since Stefan Lazarevic seems to have been stationed to the left of Bãyazîd's position. If so, it is likely to have hit the Hungarians in the flank or rear. The impact was decisive, as Schiltberger made clear: 'When all the [Turkish] foot soldiers were killed, the king advanced upon another corps which was of horse. When the Turkish king saw the king advancing, he was about to flee, but the Duke of Rascia [Serbia] known as the Despot, seeing this, went to the assistance of the Turkish king with 15,000 chosen men and many other bannerets. And the Despot threw himself with his people upon the King's banner and overturned it'.
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