Francuska artyleria podczas bitwy nad Almą, rycina z epoki
The British, French and Turkish forces landed on the Crimean Peninsula over four days between 14 and 18 September. The next day, they started their march south to Sevastopol, following a route which would take them across four separate rivers. The first day, they avoided an ambush at Bulganek river, and the next they recommenced their march to the river Alma. The commander of the expedition, Lord Raglan, knew from naval sources that Russian forces had been amassing south of the river, and approached carefully, but a battle was inevitable. After fierce fighting, the allies were victorious against the Russians, but this outcome was not inevitable, and a Russian victory could have meant a premature end to the entire Crimean campaign. As it was, the allies could continue south to Sevastopol, where the siege of the port started on 27 September. Just over a month later, the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade rode towards the Russian guns at Balaclava.
Further Reading
Essential Histories 2: The Crimean War 1854-6 gives a complete account of the war, its context and consequences. Campaign 6: Balaclava 1854 The Charge of the Light Brigade and Campaign 51: Inkerman 1854 The Soldiers' Battle detail two of the later battles of the Crimean War. To learn about the armies involved in the war, turn to Men-at-Arms 241: The Russian Army of the Crimean War 1854-56 and Men-at-Arms 196: The British Army on Campaign (2) The Crimea 1854-56. Elite 71: Queen Victoria's Commanders gives accounts of the careers and personalities of some of the commanders leading the British troops in the Crimea.
Further Reading
Essential Histories 2: The Crimean War 1854-6 gives a complete account of the war, its context and consequences. Campaign 6: Balaclava 1854 The Charge of the Light Brigade and Campaign 51: Inkerman 1854 The Soldiers' Battle detail two of the later battles of the Crimean War. To learn about the armies involved in the war, turn to Men-at-Arms 241: The Russian Army of the Crimean War 1854-56 and Men-at-Arms 196: The British Army on Campaign (2) The Crimea 1854-56. Elite 71: Queen Victoria's Commanders gives accounts of the careers and personalities of some of the commanders leading the British troops in the Crimea.
Brytyjski karabin Enfield systemu Minie wz. 1851
Gwintowany pocisk systemu Minie
Oficer 11. pułku huzarów księcia Alberta z Lekkiej Brygady uzbrojony w szablę kawaleryjską wz. 1854
Rosyjski port wojenny w Sewastopolu ok. 1850 r.
At about 11.30 am, the main allied body halted 1.5 miles (2.4km) from the Alma, as Bosquet continued to advance. Naval gunfire in his immediate support commenced at noon. The overall plan provided for Bosquet to climb the heights to engage and distract the enemy, then Canrobert and Prince Napoleon supported by Forey, would take Telegraph Height. Only after this would Raglan attack Kourgane Hill.
When Bosquet's force approached, the Russian company in the Tartar fort withdrew, and by 1 pm the French were on the heights close to the sea. At almost precisely the same moment, 4.5 miles (7.2km) further inland and still north of the river, the British resumed their advance. After half an hour, they halted again, deployed into line and lay down to await French success against Telegraph Height. They were now within enemy artillery range. One officer wrote 'I think the worse part of the whole affair was lying down in lines before we received the order to advance ... The shells bursting over us and blowing men to pieces, arms, legs and brains in all directions.'
An hour and a half later, the French had not taken Trafalgar Heights because they were unable to get sufficient artillery on to the high ground to support their infantry, as French doctrine required. Far to the allied right, Bosquet was in no position to assist.
Raglan realised, however, that the exposed British were taking heavy casualties on the northern slope, so at 3 pm he ordered his men forward. The Light Division was on the left of the front line, with the 2nd on its right straddling the post road facing Bourliouk village, to which Russian skirmishers had set fire. Behind the Light and 2nd divisions respectively were the 1st and 3rd with the 4th in reserve, as the cavalry guarded the flank.
Having issued his orders, with his staff Raglan crossed the river just west of Bourliouk under the lee of Telegraph Height to a position where he could see clearly both Kourgane Hill and the Russian reserves. Realising that the enemy might be enfiladed from this spot, he sent back for a brigade of the 2nd Division and field artillery to join him. Meanwhile, the Light Division had taken the Great Redoubt ('up the hill we went, step by step, but with a fearful carnage', in the words of one survivor), only for an unidentified staff officer to order withdrawal because he mistook advancing Russian columns for French.
At 3.40 pm, two 9-pdr. guns reached Raglan and began to harass the enemy on Kourgane Hill, as the 1st Division in the wake of the Light crossed the river and retook the redoubts: the Highland Brigade the Lesser, the Guards Brigade the Great. Ordering his command forward, Major General Sir Colin Campbell called: 'Now men, the army is watching us. Make me proud of the Highland Brigade.' In his detached eyrie Raglan observed with admiration: 'Look how the Guards and the Highlanders advance.'
With Kourgane Hill in British hands, and the French now on Telegraph Height the battle was won. When he heard that the French had scaled the downs further west, Menshikov had left Kourgane Hill and fruitlessly ridden back and forth, unable to decide when or where to commit his reserves. Returning eastwards, after the battle had been lost, he found a distraught, dismounted Gorchakov. Angrily asked why he was in such a state, Gorchakov replied: 'I am alone because all my aides-de-camp and the officers of my Staff have been killed or wounded. I have received six shots.' During a later truce, a Russian officer admitted: 'Yes, gentlemen, you won a brilliant victory at the Alma.'
It was also critical. Failure on 20 September would have brought the Crimean campaign to a premature, ignominious conclusion. However, Menshikov should never have been driven from such a strong position, which he had ample time to prepare. His over-confidence, which encouraged spectators to view the anticipated slaughter, played a major part in the battle's ultimate outcome.
When Bosquet's force approached, the Russian company in the Tartar fort withdrew, and by 1 pm the French were on the heights close to the sea. At almost precisely the same moment, 4.5 miles (7.2km) further inland and still north of the river, the British resumed their advance. After half an hour, they halted again, deployed into line and lay down to await French success against Telegraph Height. They were now within enemy artillery range. One officer wrote 'I think the worse part of the whole affair was lying down in lines before we received the order to advance ... The shells bursting over us and blowing men to pieces, arms, legs and brains in all directions.'
An hour and a half later, the French had not taken Trafalgar Heights because they were unable to get sufficient artillery on to the high ground to support their infantry, as French doctrine required. Far to the allied right, Bosquet was in no position to assist.
Raglan realised, however, that the exposed British were taking heavy casualties on the northern slope, so at 3 pm he ordered his men forward. The Light Division was on the left of the front line, with the 2nd on its right straddling the post road facing Bourliouk village, to which Russian skirmishers had set fire. Behind the Light and 2nd divisions respectively were the 1st and 3rd with the 4th in reserve, as the cavalry guarded the flank.
Having issued his orders, with his staff Raglan crossed the river just west of Bourliouk under the lee of Telegraph Height to a position where he could see clearly both Kourgane Hill and the Russian reserves. Realising that the enemy might be enfiladed from this spot, he sent back for a brigade of the 2nd Division and field artillery to join him. Meanwhile, the Light Division had taken the Great Redoubt ('up the hill we went, step by step, but with a fearful carnage', in the words of one survivor), only for an unidentified staff officer to order withdrawal because he mistook advancing Russian columns for French.
At 3.40 pm, two 9-pdr. guns reached Raglan and began to harass the enemy on Kourgane Hill, as the 1st Division in the wake of the Light crossed the river and retook the redoubts: the Highland Brigade the Lesser, the Guards Brigade the Great. Ordering his command forward, Major General Sir Colin Campbell called: 'Now men, the army is watching us. Make me proud of the Highland Brigade.' In his detached eyrie Raglan observed with admiration: 'Look how the Guards and the Highlanders advance.'
With Kourgane Hill in British hands, and the French now on Telegraph Height the battle was won. When he heard that the French had scaled the downs further west, Menshikov had left Kourgane Hill and fruitlessly ridden back and forth, unable to decide when or where to commit his reserves. Returning eastwards, after the battle had been lost, he found a distraught, dismounted Gorchakov. Angrily asked why he was in such a state, Gorchakov replied: 'I am alone because all my aides-de-camp and the officers of my Staff have been killed or wounded. I have received six shots.' During a later truce, a Russian officer admitted: 'Yes, gentlemen, you won a brilliant victory at the Alma.'
It was also critical. Failure on 20 September would have brought the Crimean campaign to a premature, ignominious conclusion. However, Menshikov should never have been driven from such a strong position, which he had ample time to prepare. His over-confidence, which encouraged spectators to view the anticipated slaughter, played a major part in the battle's ultimate outcome.
Car Mikołaj I w mundurze galowym
Cesarz Francuzów Napoleon III, mal. Franz Xaver Winterhalter
Królowa Wielkiej Brytanii Wiktoria, portret z 1837 r.
Brytyjski medal za wojnę krymską
Ks. Aleksander Mienszykow, dowódca wojsk rosyjskich na Krymie
Brytyjscy oficerowie na Krymie w 1854 r.
Born in 1788 as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, 13th child of the 5th Duke of Beaufort, he served in the Army for 51 of his 67 years, yet only actually commanded any body of troops in war in the last two years of his life. Nevertheless that command was against the major European power of the age, rather than the Asiatic or African enemies (however formidable) faced by other more battle-experienced officers herein, and he consequently deserves a place among them.
After a brief education at Westminster he received a cornetcy in the 4th Light Dragoons just before his 16th birthday. Four years later he was a captain, though with little soldiering to show for it, only attachment as an aide on a diplomatic mission to Turkey. Then came his next appointment, as ADC to the Duke of Wellington (then still Wellesley) when he began his command in the Peninsular War in 1808.
So began a military association and close friendship which were to last for 44 years. Somerset held different ranks in four regiments but never served with them. He was involved in more diplomatic missions, but mostly, as he rose from captain to major-general, he served as Wellington's Military Secretary. As such he witnessed 15 battles in the Peninsula, being wounded at Busaco and losing his right arm at Waterloo, but earning the KCB. After 1815 he continued at Wellington's side during the Duke's appointments as Master-General of the Ordnance (MGO) and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As the Duke aged more work fell upon Somerset which he loyally performed for his old chief. When Wellington died in 1852 Somerset had hoped to succeed him as C-in-C, but had to be content with Wellington's earlier post of MGO, a peerage as 1st Baron Raglan and the GCB. While acting (very capably) as MGO, he was appointed to command the Army of the East on the outbreak of war with Russia.
Although he had closely observed Wellington exercising command in the field between 1808 and 1815, he had never commanded so much as a company himself. He had shown courage and ability as a staff officer on the battlefield, but he had spent the last 39 years in a Whitehall office. Inevitably, too, he had become much influenced by Wellington's conservatism about the Army. Seniority was obviously a factor in selection for this important command and, of four possible contenders of sufficient seniority, Raglan, at 66, was the only one then aged under 70.
He was kindly, courteous and conscientious, but not a natural commander. The victories of Alma and Inkerman and the avoidance of defeat at Balaclava were secured by his troops, not by his tactical skill and leadership. The dreadful sufferings of those troops in the first winter, and his inability to respond, elicited much criticism of him, both from the army and from those at home. When the June assault on Sebastopol failed he died, as much from depression and the burden of command as from failing health. He was much mourned in the army, even by his critics. Florence Nightingale summed him up: 'He was not a very good general, but he was a very good man'.
After a brief education at Westminster he received a cornetcy in the 4th Light Dragoons just before his 16th birthday. Four years later he was a captain, though with little soldiering to show for it, only attachment as an aide on a diplomatic mission to Turkey. Then came his next appointment, as ADC to the Duke of Wellington (then still Wellesley) when he began his command in the Peninsular War in 1808.
So began a military association and close friendship which were to last for 44 years. Somerset held different ranks in four regiments but never served with them. He was involved in more diplomatic missions, but mostly, as he rose from captain to major-general, he served as Wellington's Military Secretary. As such he witnessed 15 battles in the Peninsula, being wounded at Busaco and losing his right arm at Waterloo, but earning the KCB. After 1815 he continued at Wellington's side during the Duke's appointments as Master-General of the Ordnance (MGO) and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As the Duke aged more work fell upon Somerset which he loyally performed for his old chief. When Wellington died in 1852 Somerset had hoped to succeed him as C-in-C, but had to be content with Wellington's earlier post of MGO, a peerage as 1st Baron Raglan and the GCB. While acting (very capably) as MGO, he was appointed to command the Army of the East on the outbreak of war with Russia.
Although he had closely observed Wellington exercising command in the field between 1808 and 1815, he had never commanded so much as a company himself. He had shown courage and ability as a staff officer on the battlefield, but he had spent the last 39 years in a Whitehall office. Inevitably, too, he had become much influenced by Wellington's conservatism about the Army. Seniority was obviously a factor in selection for this important command and, of four possible contenders of sufficient seniority, Raglan, at 66, was the only one then aged under 70.
He was kindly, courteous and conscientious, but not a natural commander. The victories of Alma and Inkerman and the avoidance of defeat at Balaclava were secured by his troops, not by his tactical skill and leadership. The dreadful sufferings of those troops in the first winter, and his inability to respond, elicited much criticism of him, both from the army and from those at home. When the June assault on Sebastopol failed he died, as much from depression and the burden of command as from failing health. He was much mourned in the army, even by his critics. Florence Nightingale summed him up: 'He was not a very good general, but he was a very good man'.
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